This criteria report updates and replaces the following criteria reports:

- Tax-Supported Rating Criteria (August 2012)
- U.S. State Government Tax-Supported Rating Criteria (August 2012)
- U.S. Local Government Tax-Supported Rating Criteria (August 2012)
- Rating Guidelines for State Credit Enhancement Programs (April 2013)
- Rating Guidelines for Moral Obligations (April 2013)

The revised criteria will be applied immediately to all new issue and surveillance rating reviews. Fitch anticipates that the revised criteria will be applied to all tax-supported public finance ratings that fall under the revised criteria within a 12-month period from the date of this report.

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Scope

This report outlines the criteria that apply to the rating of debt issued by or on behalf of U.S. state and local governments. These governments issue debt using a wide variety of security structures. Section 1 of the report details the criteria used to determine the general credit quality of the entity responsible for repaying the debt. Section 2 addresses how Fitch determines ratings for specific security structures.

This criteria report identifies rating factors considered by Fitch when assigning ratings to a particular entity or debt instrument within the scope of the criteria. Not all rating factors in the criteria may apply to each individual rating or rating action. Each specific rating action commentary or rating report will discuss those factors most relevant to the individual rating action.

Key Rating Drivers

Sector Risk Profile Strong: The starting point for analysis of U.S. state and local government issuers is recognition of the core features that credits in this sector share by virtue of their operation within the U.S. Given the strength of these fundamentals, Fitch expects most ratings in this sector to range from ‘AAA’ to ‘A−’, all denoting high credit quality, although individual issuer ratings can be significantly below this level due to specific credit features or concerns.

Economic Analysis Establishes Foundation: Issuer-specific analysis begins with consideration of the performance of, trends in and prospects for the economic base. This is critical to understanding the overall risk profile and serves as the foundation for the key rating factor assessments that place the credit within and sometimes outside the expected rating range. When the nature of the economic base makes an issuer particularly susceptible to an unpredictable change in profile (e.g. industry concentration, remote location), the economy can be an additional negative rating factor.

Four Key Factors Assessed: Fitch has identified four key rating factors that play a significant role in driving the rating outcome for a given issuer in the context of its economic base — revenue framework, expenditure framework, long-term liability burden and operating performance. The factors cover both the institutional framework in which an issuer operates, which varies by level and location of government, and performance within that framework. Fitch publishes specific rating category evaluations for each factor, with analysis focused on long-term trends and expectations.

Rating Through the Cycle: Fitch creates scenarios that consider how a government’s revenues may be affected in a cyclical downturn and the options available to address the resulting budget gap. Rating category expectations and metric guidance recognize that an issuer’s fiscal position will fluctuate through an economic cycle. This approach conveys the range of performance where a rating would be expected to remain stable and allows a better understanding of the potential for changes.

Bond Ratings Reflect Pledge: Ratings are assigned to specific securities based on their legal provisions and relationship to/separation from the general credit quality of the related government, which is expressed through an issuer default rating (IDR).
Section 1: Determining General Credit Quality (IDR)

Fitch assigns IDRs to state and local government tax-supported debt issuers to communicate the relative general creditworthiness of the government and its ability to meet its financial commitments. The rating is the outcome of Fitch’s assessment of the degree of the financial challenges an issuer is likely to confront, the tools it has to deal with those challenges and the extent to which we expect those tools to be utilized.

As discussed in more detail in Section 2, certain securities are rated on a basis distinct from an issuing government's IDR as a result of legal firewalls that insulate them from any financial distress or bankruptcy of the related government.

Overview of Issuer Default Rating Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Risk Profile</th>
<th>AAA</th>
<th>AA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>BBB</th>
<th>BB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expected Rating Range Given Overall U.S. Tax-Supported Sector Profile</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Economic Base

An analysis of the fundamentals and drivers of an issuer's economic base serves as the foundation for all key rating factor assessments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Framework</th>
<th>Expenditure Framework</th>
<th>Long-Term Liability Burden</th>
<th>Operating Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expectations for growth prospects for revenues</td>
<td>Expectations for pace of spending growth</td>
<td>Expectations for affordability of liabilities</td>
<td>Expectations for ability of revenues to support spending needs throughout economic cycles and over time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, in outlier cases where the nature of the economic base makes the issuer susceptible to an unpredictable change in profile (e.g. industry concentration, remote location), the economy can be an additional negative factor.

Key Rating Factor Assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Framework</th>
<th>Expenditure Framework</th>
<th>Long-Term Liability Burden</th>
<th>Operating Performance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>aaa</td>
<td>aa</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>bbb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bb</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>bb</td>
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</table>

Scenario Analysis

Informs operating performance assessment and communicates where the rating would be expected to remain stable throughout the economic cycle.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Final Issuer Default Rating (IDR) Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The ultimate rating outcome is the result of consideration of issuer-specific qualitative and quantitative factors. There is no standard weighting of factors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary of IDR Rating Framework

The sector risk profile provides a starting point for rating an issuer within the U.S. tax-supported sector, establishing a range of expected rating outcomes (‘AAA’ to ‘A−’) based on shared fundamentals. The analyst then considers a specific issuer’s risk profile within the context of the sector fundamentals.

In analyzing the specific issuer’s risk profile, evaluation of the performance of and prospects for the economic base is the critical first step. Fitch’s view of the economy provides the foundation for the appraisal of the four key rating factors that Fitch believes play the most significant role in determining the rating outcome for a given issuer.

Consideration of the four individual key rating factors helps position an issuer within the sector risk profile range and may occasionally take an issuer outside this range of ratings because of concerns specific to that issuer. Factor assessments, informed by rating category expectations, help frame an issuer’s credit rating and provide a standard way of comparing issuers to one another. Although it is possible for assessments to be lower than ‘bb’, since these cases are rare and idiosyncratic, the tax-supported sector guidance is provided only through the ‘bb’ category.

Guidance metrics support the consistency in the assessments of the four key rating factors and, ultimately, the final rating outcome. These metrics can differ for state and local governments, due to both the different revenue streams and spending responsibilities of these varied levels of government and the relative availability of comparable data, which is higher for states than for local governments. Fitch notes that metrics reflect the historical record and need to be considered in context.

Scenario analysis is an important tool in Fitch’s “through the cycle” approach to ratings, informing assessment of an issuer’s operating performance and communicating where the rating would be expected to remain stable over the course of an economic cycle and relative to historical revenue volatility, including in the case of issuers where revenues may not exhibit a significant relationship (or “correlation”) to the broader economy. Scenarios are not forecasts but simply convey possible performance in a downturn based on historical data and a common set of assumptions. Analysis considers not only how economic downturns affect individual issuers differently but also the relative ability to manage stress.

The use of scenarios provides visibility on which credits are more vulnerable to rating transition. Fitch believes that ratings should remain stable through normal cyclical fluctuations. A cycle of a depth or duration greater than that suggested by the scenario, which is designed to approximate an average downturn, could result in a higher level of rating transition. The recent Great Recession in the U.S. was such an event.

The ultimate rating outcome is the result of consideration of issuer-specific qualitative and quantitative factors. There is no standard weighting of factors. The significance of risk elements can shift quite rapidly over time and/or differ markedly across issuers.

Finally, Fitch notes that, given the nature of government credit, management decisions can always be influenced by political factors beyond Fitch’s ability to predict. In recognition of this, the rating framework seeks to be as transparent as possible in outlining the assumptions being made. Any conduct that indicates a government may choose to default on a financial obligation even when it has the capacity to pay, such as actions or statements by decision makers that Fitch deems potentially detrimental to bondholders, negatively affects the final rating.
Strong Sector Risk Profile

The starting point for analysis of U.S. state and local government credits is recognition of the core features that credits in this sector share by virtue of their operation within the U.S. Although this is not an explicit component of each issuer-specific analysis, as it is common to all, it provides the backdrop and underlies the strong expected rating range for U.S. state and local government issuers.

Macroeconomic and structural factors are a clear strength of both the U.S. sovereign credit and the credits of state and local governments within the U.S.

- The U.S. benefits from a large, rich and technologically advanced economy, high levels of human development, a favorable business climate and strong institutions.
- Rule of law and respect for property rights provide confidence that political (and civil) institutions have a strong commitment to honoring financial obligations.
- The country’s banking and financial system is sound, well-supervised and regulated.
- The legal framework governing subnational debt issuance and bondholder rights is well established and broadly consistent throughout the 50 states.

The U.S. benefits from the most developed municipal market in the world, and state and local government issuers generally enjoy good market access. Explicit deficit financing is uncommon, and most issuers balance their budgets by law or established practice, albeit often with the use of one-time gap-closing measures in downturns. There is a long record of governments in the U.S. making full and timely debt service payments even in very stressful financial situations; default rates remain extremely low even after the worst recession since the Great Depression.

U.S. state and local governments possess significant autonomy in the U.S. government framework, with a relatively high degree of control over revenue-raising and spending from a global perspective. The federal government’s power to affect state and local operations and obligations is limited. Due to this autonomy, state and local government ratings in the U.S. are not capped by the rating of higher levels of government. For the same reason, Fitch’s ratings for U.S. state and local government credits do not assume a federal government backstop or that the federal government would step in to remedy a government’s financial problems. Nevertheless, Fitch believes that operating within the U.S. economy and legal system is a significant credit factor.

Given the strength of these fundamentals, Fitch expects most ratings in this sector to range from ‘AAA’ to ‘A−’, all denoting high credit quality, although individual issuer ratings can be significantly below this level due to specific credit features or issues. This sector risk profile range does not establish a rating floor and does not simply replicate the range of existing ratings in the sector. Rather, the range emerges from the core features common to U.S. state and local government credits.

Economic Analysis Establishes Foundation

Fitch believes that a solid understanding of the drivers of and expectations for an issuer’s economic base is critical to the consideration of overall credit quality. Fitch considers economic breadth and depth, composition/concentration, volatility, long-term trends and growth prospects to establish the context in which other rating factors are assessed.

Fitch’s expectations for the economy inform the assessment of prospects for revenue growth, spending demands, the affordability of liabilities and the ability of an issuer to balance revenue and spending over time. In addition, if a particular economy is very concentrated or small or remote, such that the issuer is susceptible to a sudden and unpredictable change in profile, this represents an additional risk factor that can constrain a rating, all else being equal.
The evaluation of the economy begins with a determination of the types of economic activity that dominate in the area. Fitch identifies the major economic drivers for an issuer and their direction and considers factors that either enhance or inhibit expectations for growth. For issuers dependent on property taxes for a sizable portion of their revenue, Fitch pays particular attention to the level of and trends in the valuation of the total tax base and the largest taxpayers.

Fitch reviews trends in employment and seeks to understand why a significant sector or area has expanded or contracted. Historical and recent gains or losses in overall employment are evaluated not only to gauge general expansion trends and future prospects, but also to track cyclicality and sensitivity to broader national and regional developments. Trends in unemployment are reviewed in the context of labor force changes and other factors that might have an impact.

Income levels are evaluated on both an absolute and a relative basis. Trends provide an indication of the rate of economic value being created, which has implications for future revenue performance compared to the region and nation. The industry breakdown of personal income, when available, is also a valuable analytical tool for understanding which sectors are most influential in the economy, both in their relative importance compared to other credits and performance over time.

Fitch reviews key demographic metrics, particularly population trends, considering the reasons why a particular area attracts or loses population to evaluate the likely future trajectory. Demographic structure and projections are important for assessing both revenue prospects and future expenditure pressures, including in healthcare and education.

Although population growth is usually considered a positive factor, population stability can also be a positive rating consideration, particularly for smaller communities that do not have a wide range of service demands and spending pressures. Conversely, high-growth areas can pose risks, as capital needs are often great, and providing the appropriate level of infrastructure and services to match, but not exceed, growth needs can be difficult.

### Four Key Rating Factors

The four key rating factors are assessed using the guidance table on the following page, which outlines general expectations for a given rating category. Subfactors in each case highlight the components that are most critical in making the assessment. All assessments are grounded in issuer-specific data.
### Key Rating Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revenue Framework</th>
<th>aaa</th>
<th>aa</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>bbb</th>
<th>bb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth Prospects for Revenues Without Revenue-Raising Measures</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Stagnant</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Legal Ability to Raise Operating Revenues Without External Approval (In Relation to Normal Cyclical Revenue Decline)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Additional Considerations | In cases where an entity relies heavily on third-party funding (e.g. from a higher level of government) in support of core functions that likely would continue at the same level even without the external support, an evaluation of the associated risk informs the assessment. Third-party support can be a positive consideration in the overall framework assessment in cases where Fitch believes that support can be relied upon, for example state support of school districts. The requirement for periodic re-authorization of existing revenue streams is a negative consideration. In addition, in rare cases, there may be other factors, such as an unusually concentrated or volatile revenue base, that have a negative effect on the assessment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure Framework</th>
<th>Natural Pace of Spending Growth Relative to Expected Revenue Growth (Based on Current Spending Profile)</th>
<th>Slower to equal</th>
<th>In line with to marginally above</th>
<th>Above</th>
<th>Well above</th>
<th>Very high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of Main Expenditure Items (Ability to Cut Spending Throughout the Economic Cycle)</td>
<td>Ample</td>
<td>Solid</td>
<td>Adequate; legal or practical limits to budget management may result in manageable cuts to core services at times of economic downturn</td>
<td>Limited; cuts likely to meaningfully, but not critically, reduce core services at times of economic downturn</td>
<td>Constrained; adequate delivery of core services may be compromised at times of economic downturn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Considerations</td>
<td>The analysis of an issuer’s expenditure framework also considers potential funding pressures, including outstanding or pending litigation, internal service fund liabilities and contingent obligations.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Long-Term Liability Burden</th>
<th>Combined Burden of Debt and Unfunded Pension Liabilities in Relation to Resource Base</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Elevated but still in the moderate range</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Very high</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities less than 10% of personal income</td>
<td>Liabilities less than 20% of personal income</td>
<td>Liabilities less than 40% of personal income</td>
<td>Liabilities less than 60% of personal income</td>
<td>Liabilities 60% or more of personal income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Considerations</td>
<td>The liability burden assessment could be negatively affected by high levels of derivatives exposure, short-term debt, variable-rate debt or bullet maturity debt or an exceptionally large OPEB liability without the ability or willingness to make changes to benefits. An exceptionally large accounts payable backlog can also negatively affect the long-term liability burden assessment.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operating Performance</th>
<th>Financial Resilience Through Downturns (Based on Interpretation of Scenario Analysis)</th>
<th>Exceptionally strong gap-closing capacity; expected to manage through economic downturns while maintaining a high level of fundamental financial flexibility.</th>
<th>Very strong gap-closing capacity; expected to manage through economic downturns while maintaining an adequate level of fundamental financial flexibility.</th>
<th>Strong gap-closing capacity; financial operations would be more challenged in a downturn than is the case for higher rating levels but expected to recover financial flexibility.</th>
<th>Adequate gap-closing capacity; financial operations could become stressed in a downturn, but expected to recover financial flexibility.</th>
<th>Limited gap-closing capacity; financial operations could become distressed in a downturn and might not recover.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Budget Management at Times of Economic Recovery</td>
<td>Rapid rebuilding of financial flexibility when needed, with no material deferral of required spending/nonrecurring support of operations.</td>
<td>Consistent efforts in support of financial flexibility, with limited to no material deferral of required spending/nonrecurring support of operations.</td>
<td>Some deferral of required spending/nonrecurring support of operations.</td>
<td>Significant deferral of required spending/nonrecurring support of operations.</td>
<td>Deferral of required spending/nonrecurring support of operations that risks becoming untenable given tools available to the issuer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Considerations</td>
<td>The operating performance assessment could be negatively affected by liquidity or market access concerns (in general, liquidity becomes a concern if the government-wide days cash on hand metric has or is expected to fall below 60 days); the risk of an outside party (e.g. another level of government) having a negative impact on operations; evidence of an exceptional degree of taxpayer dissatisfaction, particularly in environments with easy access to the voter-initiative process; or management weaknesses not captured above.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**OPEB – Other post-employment benefits.**
Fitch explicitly does not weight the assessments of individual key rating factors in coming to an overall rating conclusion. There is no standard formula to link these inputs into an exact rating. The relative importance of factors is specific to the individual credit being considered.

As noted, the individual factor assessments inform but do not dictate the final rating outcome. Moreover, Fitch stresses that the key rating factors do not cover every possible credit consideration, just those that Fitch believes to be the most important in the majority of cases. Other factors specific to individual credits may be significant to the rating outcome for a given issuer.

**Revenue Framework**

Fitch considers two subfactors in assessing the strength of a government’s revenue framework: growth prospects for revenues and the government’s legal ability to raise revenues. The goal of this assessment is to establish expectations for the issuer’s revenue system, incorporating both likely performance in the absence of policy action and the issuer’s independent legal ability to make changes over time.

Fitch notes that an issuer’s revenue base may be narrower than its economic base. For example, a specific industry, such as natural resource production, may contribute a disproportionate share of tax revenues, resulting in a revenue base that is narrower than the economic base would suggest. Fitch’s analysis focuses on the issuer’s revenue base.

**Growth Prospects for Revenues**

*Metrics to Support Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Governments</th>
<th>Local Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10-year performance of tax revenues (adjusted for the estimated impact of changes in tax policy) in comparison to growth in national GDP and inflation</td>
<td>10-year performance of general fund revenues in comparison to growth in national GDP and inflation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Historical performance is used as a factor for consideration of future performance. Expectations for growth in line with or above the level of U.S. economic performance without the need for tax increases are consistent with a ‘aaa’ assessment; growth below U.S. economic performance but above the level of inflation, ‘aa’; growth in line with the level of inflation, ‘a’; growth below the level of inflation or flat performance, ‘bbb’; and a declining revenue trajectory, ‘bb’.

The assessment of growth prospects for revenues is driven largely by expectations for the issuer’s economic performance and the nature of the revenue system as it relates to the issuer’s economic base. The assessment is made without consideration of policy action a government could take to affect revenues, e.g. raising or cutting tax rates, but takes into account legal limits on the government’s ability to capture economic growth that dampen expectations for revenue performance going forward. The strongest revenue systems are those that are likely to see consistent revenue growth in line with or above the level of economic growth, while stagnant or declining performance is a source of credit concern.

Fitch’s analysis focuses on historical and expected revenue performance and risks rather than giving credit for revenue diversity as a stand-alone factor. In general, a diverse revenue system with a foundation of broad-based taxes is better able to capture an issuer’s economic activity than one that relies on particularly narrow and/or variable revenues, such as real estate transaction taxes or hotel occupancy taxes.

Fitch notes that there is often a tradeoff between growth prospects and volatility. Tax revenues in states, which are generally funded primarily from income and sales taxes, tend to react quickly to changes in economic conditions. Local governments that have revenue systems weighted toward property taxes tend to lag and be generally less susceptible to the effects of economic cycles. This results in more volatile revenue systems for states, but also ones that have proven better able to capture economic growth over time.
The growth prospects for revenues subfactor is meant to consider the ability to capture economic growth rather than volatility. The assessment is guided by comparisons of actual historical revenue performance in relation to national GDP and inflation over an extended period, recognizing that more volatile revenue systems are likely to perform better or worse in a given year based on the point in the economic cycle.

Legal Ability to Raise Revenues

**Metrics to Support Assessment**

- In many cases, particularly for state governments, there is no legal limitation on the ability to increase revenues, and therefore, no metric is required.
- For issuers that have a legal limitation on raising revenues for operations, Fitch calculates a metric that considers the maximum revenue increase permitted by law as a percentage of the revenue decline in the 1% national GDP decline economic downturn scenario that Fitch applies to all credits. For a ‘aaa’ assessment, the maximum revenue increase must be at least 300% of the scenario revenue decline; for ‘aa’, at least 200%; for ‘a’, at least 100%; and for ‘bbb’, at least 50%.

The second component of the revenue framework assessment is the government’s independent legal ability to increase operating revenues. This involves consideration of the range of legal limits on the government’s autonomy in this area, including tax caps and requirements for approvals from voters or other levels of government. Fitch considers the government to have independent legal revenue-raising ability as long as such action is at the discretion of the governing body, even if a supermajority or other such requirements exist. Given the focus on incorporating only potential tax changes that are in the control of the government, tax caps that limit annual increases to specific economic metrics, such as inflation or population growth, are not considered a source of revenue-raising flexibility upon which the government can rely in a downturn.

Consistent with Fitch’s approach to analysis tailored to the specifics of the issuer’s risk profile, legal revenue-raising ability is placed in the context of the sensitivity of the issuer’s revenue to economic downturns. For issuers to receive the same assessment, one with revenues that decline steeply in a downturn must have greater revenue raising flexibility than one that has more steady performance through the cycle.

Fitch stresses that the focus of this assessment is on the government’s legal control over its revenue system. While noting that tax increases can be politically or practically difficult in many cases, Fitch believes the legal framework is a significant differentiating factor in assessing the ability to manage fiscal challenges. A government can be evaluated highly on this subfactor even if the analyst believes the issuer is unlikely to raise taxes. Expectations for what tools an issuer would be more or less likely to use when confronted with fiscal challenges are qualitative factors incorporated in the operating performance assessment discussed below.

**Additional Considerations**

In rare cases, there may be other factors, such as an unusually concentrated revenue base, that have a negative effect on the revenue framework assessment. For example, a single taxpayer could represent a notably large share of a government’s revenues. Exceptional levels of volatility can also be a negative consideration.

For entities that rely heavily on funding from another unit of government, Fitch evaluates the consistency of the funding and how potential adjustments would affect the rated issuer. For example, if outside-party funding supports spending for a specific program that could be modified or eliminated in the absence of that external support, it is generally not a key factor in the rating analysis. In contrast, in cases where the outside-party funding supports core functions that likely would continue at the same level even without the external support, Fitch considers an evaluation of that revenue risk critical to the analysis of the issuer’s credit quality.
Third-party support can be a positive consideration in the overall revenue framework assessment in cases where Fitch believes the support can be relied on. The most obvious example of this is state support for K-12 education, which is fundamentally a state constitutional responsibility. This expectation of support offsets the limited ability of most school districts to independently raise revenues. Fitch does not believe that this additional consideration is a negative factor for any U.S. state, despite the large amount of federal government funding for Medicaid in state budgets. States have largely sovereign powers under the U.S. system of government, and there is significant state control over related budget decisions.

The requirement for periodic re-authorization of existing revenue streams, for example by voter approval, is a negative consideration.

**Expenditure Framework**

The second key rating factor, expenditure framework, focuses on the sustainability and flexibility of government spending. Specifically, Fitch considers the pace of expected spending growth as it compares to expectations for growth in the government’s revenue base as well as the flexibility of the government’s expenditures. Fitch thereby assesses how pressured an issuer is likely to be based on the natural pattern of spending growth and how well positioned it is to manage that growth throughout the economic cycle.

**Pace of Spending Growth**

*Metrics to Support Assessment*

- Analysts review time-series data on the issuer’s revenue and spending; however, given the ability of governments to manage reported spending and revenues to meet balanced budget requirements, historical figures are of limited use in identifying organic spending growth trends.
- Therefore, expectations for the pace of spending growth in the absence of policy action are most heavily influenced by Fitch’s analysis of and expectations for the components of a government’s spending.

After evaluating an issuer’s current spending responsibilities and policy positions, Fitch considers baseline trends in spending as compared to the expected organic growth in revenues (i.e. growth in the absence of revenue-raising measures) over time, as assessed in the preceding Revenue Framework section. This analysis identifies the main drivers of spending and is informed by Fitch’s expectations for the issuer’s economic trajectory. Fitch notes that the demands of certain expenditure items, such as Medicaid, tend to rise at times of economic and revenue decline. This assessment is meant to consider expected performance on average over time.

Of note, the assessment is not meant to address whether the issuer’s finances are in balance, which is the focus of the operating performance analysis described below. Rather, it is designed to establish expectations for how an operating gap may grow, remain stable or decrease over time given the pace of revenue and spending growth in the absence of offsetting action by management. In cases where key spending demands are expected to grow at a materially more rapid pace than revenues, Fitch would expect this “current services” budget gap to result in ongoing and likely growing fiscal challenges over time.

The key credit consideration is the ability of the government’s revenue base to support the spending it undertakes. The absolute level of a government’s spending does not directly correlate to credit quality; comparatively high-spending governments can be very strong credits, while governments with much more limited spending can be financially strained.
Fitch notes that some spending items are significantly easier to control than others. Fitch considers the inherent flexibility of the types of funding or services the government provides and the specifics of that government’s situation, evaluating the practical as well as legal ability to reduce spending. This is in contrast to the assessment of the government’s revenue framework, where Fitch focuses only on the legal flexibility to raise revenues and holds consideration of whether a particular government would actually raise tax rates for the operating performance key rating factor assessment. This reflects Fitch’s observation that there is generally a base level of services a government must provide that is often well above legal requirements, if any, for such services.

The outcome of voter initiatives and court decisions can constrain spending flexibility. In addition, inflexible statutory or constitutional operating limitations are potential credit risks, as they constrain an issuer’s ability to react to negative developments.

As one measure of the impact of fixed costs on the budget, Fitch aggregates debt service, the actuarially calculated sustainable pension contribution level (whether or not it is fully funded) and the government’s annual other post-employment benefits (OPEB) payment. This burden is calculated as a percentage of spending, with the analysis including an assessment of both current demands and expectations for future costs.

Fitch uses the actuarially based contribution level in calculating the budget demands of pensions, even though many governments have delayed pension funding at times of fiscal stress. This is because, in Fitch’s opinion, such delays only result in increasing costs longer term and are a form of deficit financing. Conversely, the focus on the actual as opposed to actuarially based contribution for OPEB reflects Fitch’s belief that these benefits are more flexible in many cases. Fitch recognizes that, if a government pays only the annual cost of OPEB, it could be saddled with ballooning payments as a result of rising retirement and medical costs over time and considers the actuarially based contribution compared to the actual contribution. However, this concern can be offset by the capacity to make benefit changes as needed.

### Additional Considerations

The analysis of an issuer’s expenditure framework also considers potential funding pressures, including:

- Outstanding or pending litigation.
- Internal service fund liabilities (e.g. workers’ compensation).
- Contingent obligations.
If these rise to the level of credit concern, they could have a negative effect on the expenditure framework assessment.

**Long-Term Liability Burden**

The assessment of long-term liabilities focuses on the extent and nature of an issuer’s incurred liabilities and the outlook for the future given the issuer’s growth prospects or lack thereof, with a focus on affordability in both the near and long terms.

**Long-Term Liability Burden**

*Metrics to Support Assessment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Governments</th>
<th>Local Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct debt + Fitch-adjusted direct unfunded pension liability as a percentage of personal income</td>
<td>Overall local governmental debt + Fitch-adjusted direct unfunded pension liability as a percentage of personal income (population multiplied by per capita income)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Using current metrics as a base, analysis focuses on expectations for the future, incorporating capital plans/needs and the pace at which debt is paid down, current pension contribution policies and economic expectations.
- Liabilities as a percentage of income indicate the burden on the economic base and represent the primary metric. Fitch also considers direct debt plus the Fitch-adjusted direct unfunded pension liability as a percentage of governmental revenues, which indicates the burden on an issuer’s budget, as well as, for local governments, the liability burden as a percentage of property value, which is relevant to the property tax base.
- Fitch considers a liabilities-to-income metric of less than 10% to be consistent with a 'aaa' assessment; less than 20%, 'aa'; less than 40%, 'a'; and less than 60%, 'bbb'.

Fitch considers the combined debt and unfunded pension liability metric to be of primary importance in the assessment of a government’s long-term liability burden. Fitch believes that debt and unfunded pension liabilities are effectively equivalent obligations, despite the significant number of assumptions that go into calculation of pension liabilities, challenges to direct comparability from issuer to issuer and the volatility in reported pension liabilities linked to market returns.

Fitch considers the credit impact of OPEB in evaluating a government’s expenditure framework and operating performance but does not include the figure as part of an issuer’s long-term liability burden. Fitch does not judge OPEB liabilities to be akin to debt and unfunded pensions. The factors that go into computing an OPEB liability, particularly the long-term cost trend of healthcare, are more uncertain than is the case for pensions. Moreover, OPEB have proven much easier to change than pensions, and legal protections appear limited in most cases. As such, OPEB influence the assessment of the long-term liability burden key rating factor only in cases where the estimated liability is exceptionally large and not subject to modification.

Fitch notes that the annual budget cost associated with a government’s long-term liabilities is not a consideration in the long-term liability burden assessment. Rather, that aspect of a government’s risk profile is incorporated in the aforementioned expenditure framework evaluation.

**Debt Considerations**

The evaluation of an issuer’s debt burden incorporates not only current levels but also Fitch’s assessment of capital needs, including from mandates and deferred maintenance where evident, and the expectations for the economic base’s capacity to support that debt.

Debt analysis includes a review of trends in the amount of debt issued and outstanding in relation to resources. Sustained increases in debt at a rate in excess of economic growth run the risk of overburdening a tax base and straining budget resources.
Fitch reviews the types and proportions of debt utilized (e.g. GO, appropriation-backed or dedicated tax) and the rate at which the debt is repaid. Typically, U.S. tax-supported debt amortizes over 20- to 30-year periods. Balloon payments and associated refinancing stress are uncommon. A government with faster debt amortization benefits from greater financial flexibility and the fiscal capacity to continuously finance its capital requirements as debt rolling off makes room for new issuance.

Fitch evaluates the burden of debt relative to the issuer’s economic base and the size of its budget. Debt measures are reviewed in the context of factors that affect the magnitude of borrowing, such as the allocation of functions among various levels of government.

Calculations include all long-term fixed obligations of the issuer, excluding debt fully supported by user charges and tobacco settlement bonds. Debt that has been defeased, either legally or economically, is also excluded. Notes and commercial paper are included in debt calculations unless they are expected to be repaid within the fiscal period from cash flow.

Fitch includes in its calculations contracts with associated debt that would become the obligation of the issuer if it failed to comply with the ongoing payment terms of the contract, most commonly related to availability-based public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements. Such transactions require payments by the government over the life of the contract and are distinct from demand-based PPPs, which are funded from user charges (tolls) rather than ongoing government payments absent a specific minimum revenue guarantee. Fitch does not include debt associated with demand-based PPPs in a government’s debt calculations.

Fitch views the disclosure of all debt obligations of the entity, including direct bank placements and other obligations that may not carry ratings, to be a management best practice. Fitch includes all such obligations, including the impact of any covenants they may contain (particularly acceleration), in its analysis.

Fitch examines not only liabilities directly incurred and payable from the issuer’s tax revenues but also outstanding debt for which the issuer may be obligated in the future. Examples include bonds intended to be supported by non-tax revenues, such as tolls, and moral obligations, where the issuer may, but is not legally obligated to, support the debt upon failure of the primary security. Such obligations are monitored but typically excluded from direct debt calculations unless the issuer’s resources have been relied on to cover the obligation during the past three years or Fitch believes that they will be needed going forward. In cases where the inclusion of debt of this type in the issuer’s debt calculations could have a rating impact, Fitch will evaluate the credit quality of the expected repayment source to confirm its investment-grade credit quality.

**Pension Considerations**

Fitch’s analysis of a government’s unfunded or net pension liability burden considers defined benefit pension plans only; defined contribution plans are a predictable annual commitment and considered in the assessment of an issuer’s expenditure framework.

As with debt, when evaluating an issuer’s unfunded or net pension liability, Fitch considers not only the current liability but also the expected trajectory. The analysis of pension obligations takes into account whether there has been stabilization or progress in the ratio of assets to liabilities over time and a commitment to contributing at actuarially sustainable levels. The analysis also considers actuarial and other assumptions influencing the burden. Concerns arise if the unfunded or net liability level is high or increasing or if the actual contribution is consistently below actuarially sustainable levels such that the burden is likely to grow.
Concerns also arise if one or more assumptions underlying the liability or contributions are unrealistic or would likely fail to reduce the unfunded or net liability over time.

For each rated entity, Fitch closely evaluates all significant pension plans for which the government has responsibility. To improve comparability among plans, Fitch creates a standardized investment return scenario, estimating the unfunded liability with a 7% investment return assumption adjustment, rather than as reported by the system. In cases where the unfunded or net liability is sizable, actions or plans to reduce it over time are considered a positive credit attribute.

**Additional Considerations**

Fitch analyzes an issuer’s liability structure to ensure that all associated risks are fully considered. Although unusual for a U.S. state or local government, the long-term liability burden assessment could be negatively affected by:

- Derivatives exposure.
- Short-term debt.
- Variable-rate debt.
- Debt with bullet maturities.
- Exceptionally large OPEB liabilities without the capacity to make changes to benefits.

In analyzing these risks, Fitch focuses on the materiality and manageability of such obligations, including rollover risk when relevant, given the issuer’s operating and liquidity profile. If provisions included in liquidity or swap agreements expose an issuer to events outside its control that Fitch believes could impose a material liquidity risk or additional liability, this would be factored into the assessment. Similarly, OPEB liabilities that Fitch assesses to be unmanageable over the longer term would lower the factor assessment. An exceptionally large accounts payable backlog can also negatively affect the long-term liability burden assessment.

**Operating Performance**

Whereas the first three key rating factors are primarily focused on the assessment of foundational credit items — the “raw material” of the credit — the final key factor, operating performance, addresses how an issuer functions within that framework, drawing from the assessments that come before it. It considers how Fitch expects a credit to perform throughout economic cycles, given both exposure to economic downturns and the issuer’s demonstrated capacity to take offsetting action that maintains credit quality. By highlighting financial resilience through downturns and budget management at times of economic recovery, the operating performance assessment is meant to focus analysis on the issuer’s fundamental financial profile rather than variable performance in a particular year.

**Financial Resilience Through Downturns**

*Metrics to Support Assessment*

- Interpretation of scenario analysis results, discussed in Scenario Analysis on page 18, is the primary driver of the financial resilience assessment for both state and local governments.

Given the significance of these considerations to overall credit quality — Fitch’s rating definitions distinguish credits primarily based on relative vulnerability to adverse business or economic conditions — in most cases, the assessment of operating performance is particularly important to determining the final rating. Strong financial decision making can result in a high rating for a credit with a comparatively higher underlying risk profile if Fitch judges that adequate steps have been taken to mitigate risks. On the other hand, weak financial decision making can result in a lower rating than a credit’s underlying risk profile would suggest.
Financial flexibility is of primary credit importance because it allows an issuer to address periods of volatility without eroding credit quality.

The financial resilience subfactor highlights the relative ability of a government to manage through a revenue downturn, with a focus on the level of financial flexibility throughout the cycle. The financial resilience assessment is primarily informed by scenario analysis (discussed in further detail on page 18).

Scenarios consider how a given issuer may be affected by a specified hypothetical downturn that is applied consistently across credits. The analyst then makes the financial resilience assessment based on the issuer’s capacity to manage through that scenario.

Interpretation of scenario analysis results necessarily reflects and is consistent with the prior assessments of revenue control and expenditure flexibility and factors in the issuer’s cushion against unexpected events. Together, these elements — inherent budget flexibility on the revenue and spending side and the level of reserves available to support operations — represent an issuer’s gap-closing capacity.

Scenarios do not dictate a particular assessment or rating outcome. Analysts consider the totality of the government’s financial profile when evaluating the results and forming an assessment.

**Consideration of Reserves in Fitch’s Rating Analysis**

Fitch considers the level of a government’s reserves to be an important credit consideration and evaluates the adequacy of such reserves through scenario analysis. Fitch’s reserve expectations are credit and rating specific, recognizing that governments have three broad categories of financial flexibility to react to deteriorating conditions: revenue increases, expenditure cuts and use of reserves. Fitch recognizes that reserve levels fluctuate throughout the economic cycle and does not set static expectations for reserves.

In Fitch’s view, the value of incremental reserves above a certain level — related to an issuer’s budget volatility, budget control and liquidity profile — is limited from a rating perspective but may be significant to the government for other reasons. The appropriate level of reserves is very specific to an individual government’s circumstances, a function of both credit-relevant and broader policy considerations.

One government may choose to maintain sizable reserves to avoid the need for disruptive and pro-cyclical budget cuts or revenue increases in a downturn, while another may choose to rely more on other budget management tools to maintain balance. As Fitch’s IDRs communicate the distance from default and likelihood of rating transition, the key consideration is how choices made affect expectations for financial flexibility throughout economic cycles.
Budget Management at Times of Economic Recovery

Metrics to Support Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Governments</th>
<th>Local Governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consideration of historical and expected budgeting practices</td>
<td>Consideration of historical and expected budgeting practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollar difference between pension ARC/ADEC and actual pension funding as a percentage of spending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- States have extensive flexibility to manage their budgets in ways that could present future budget challenges.
- Local governments have more limited opportunities to defer spending. Away from fund balance draws and idiosyncratic one-time actions, the biggest area of potential deferral for local governments is reducing annual pension contributions. Therefore, an assessment of actual annual pension contributions compared to actuarially sustainable annual contribution levels is one factor in considering the sustainability of local government budget decisions, although its benefit is tempered by the numerous variable assumptions that go into calculation of an ARC/ADEC and the widely ranging magnitude of pension contributions in relation to the size of the budget.

An issuer’s budget management during periods of economic recovery is a key determinant of its resilience at times of decline and, therefore, critical to the operating performance assessment. In addition, Fitch notes that a government’s reported balanced budget figures can mask sometimes extensive use of nonrecurring measures, making explicit examination of this point critical in credit analysis.

Credit quality can be weakened when budget decisions made in a downturn — such as underfunding/deferral of liabilities — weaken an issuer’s financial cushion or create future obligations that may be difficult to meet even once the economy recovers. This risk is magnified when such actions are undertaken even during economic recoveries, and the consequent increase in a government’s risk profile will be revealed in a reduced capacity to address a future downturn.

State government powers and functions provide extensive abilities to underfund obligations. Local governments have more limited options. One option available to both is the underfunding of pension liabilities. Due to the labor-intensive nature of local governments, pension funding is more significant as a percentage of local budgets.

Fitch does not expect government budgets to be truly balanced in downturns; for practical and policy reasons, in many cases, reserves will be drawn on and operating spending deferred to a point at times of cyclical decline. However, to preserve credit quality, it is important for an issuer to bolster its financial position at times of economic growth in preparation for the next downturn.

Additional Considerations

In addition to the aforementioned considerations, the operating performance assessment could be negatively affected in cases of the following:
- Liquidity concerns (see below).
- Risk of an outside party (e.g., another level of government) having a negative impact on operations.
- Evidence of a high degree of taxpayer dissatisfaction, particularly in environments with easy access to the voter-initiative process.
- Market access concerns (typically present with lower ratings).
- Management weaknesses not captured elsewhere, such as late or problematic audited financial reports.
Liquidity

U.S. state and local governments generally have solid liquidity without reliance on external resources and also enjoy broad market access. Most have demonstrated ample liquidity to meet financial obligations throughout economic cycles.

As part of the operating performance assessment, Fitch considers a government’s liquidity needs and internal and external liquidity resources. The analysis focuses on resources that could be expected to be available to a government in a downturn, when liquidity is most likely to be strained. Those in the strongest position have a stable and predictable flow of revenue and expenses and are not reliant on external borrowing for cash flow needs, even in economic down cycles.

State governments have extensive tools to support liquidity, both explicit (e.g. cash balances) and implicit (e.g. the ability to delay distributions to local governments). As such, the analysis of a state’s liquidity position is holistic and cannot be expressed in a single number.

For local governments, which have more limited tools, Fitch believes that a government-wide cash analysis adequately captures an issuer’s liquidity position. In general, liquidity becomes a concern and warrants additional consideration if the government-wide days cash on hand metric has or is expected to fall below 60 days.

Impact of Outside Parties on Operating Performance

Fitch includes as an additional consideration the risk of an outside party, such as a higher or related government or court, having a negative effect on an issuer’s financial position. This is meant to highlight unusual situations that may not already be incorporated in the assessment. For example, in some jurisdictions, elected law enforcement or judicial officials may present budgets that cannot be modified by the taxing authority. Similarly, in some cases, school budgets adopted by independent school boards are by law included in the general government budget. This results in uncertainty that may warrant additional consideration in the operating performance assessment.

Fitch notes that outside parties can have a positive impact on operations, such as when a state control board or state oversight improves prospects for a local government’s financial position. Most states have some formal mechanism for assisting distressed local governments. Fitch does not assume in its ratings that such mechanisms will be invoked and, once invoked, will be effective. However, once an entity becomes sufficiently distressed for a state-sponsored remediation plan to be put in place, the entity’s rating may be higher than it would be absent the intervention, depending on the impact of intervention. Fitch believes that the benefit of such relationships can be adequately reflected in the standard factor assessments rather than as an additional consideration.

Scenarios Address Rating Tolerance

Scenario analysis considers potential performance under a common set of assumptions, thereby illustrating how cycles affect individual issuers differently.

Fitch’s scenario analysis framework for state and local governments utilizes the Fitch Analytical Sensitivity Tool — States & Locals (FAST) V.20, which highlights how an issuer’s financial position can change through an economic cycle and what level of change can be considered consistent with the existing rating. FAST supports Fitch’s through-the-cycle analysis but does not create a forecast. It does not generate a rating but provides analytical information used in the rating process.
Fitch’s overarching philosophy is that ratings should not change due to normal cyclical variations. Economic downturns are inevitable, and even if an issuer’s revenue stream has not evidenced a high correlation to the broader economy, significant year-to-year variations in revenue performance in many cases can be observed. Fitch believes that ratings should account for this. On the other hand, broad shifts different from the ebb and flow of a normal economic cycle are also inevitable. Scenario analysis helps make the distinction between the two and communicate what rises to the level of a credit event and what is already anticipated in the current rating.

Once general expectations for the issuer’s performance through the cycle are established, a rating would change only when performance is outside of these expectations. For example, deterioration of the issuer’s financial cushion during a revenue downturn would not trigger a rating change as long as the cushion remains above minimum expectations for that point in the cycle, adjustments are under way if that threshold is approaching, and Fitch expects the cushion to be rebuilt to higher levels in a recovery.

FAST provides an objectively derived and empirically based starting point for assessing how a government’s revenues may be affected in a consistently defined downturn and gauging the ability of an issuer to manage the decline. It allows for uniformity in the input variable being stressed and provides a means for analysts to better understand how revenues historically have evolved over the cycle and relative to peers.

Revenue Sensitivity Analysis

Revenue sensitivity analysis considers an issuer’s historical revenue performance and uses that information to estimate possible future revenue behavior in a downturn.

FAST incorporates a model in which inputs and outputs are formulated from a consistent set of decision rules, using national GDP as a key scenario input. The model scales the revenue impact of a cyclical decline for a given issuer based on the GDP scenario being considered. For issuers where the change in revenues has evidenced a strong correlation to changes in GDP, the use of GDP connotes a reaction in revenues to the general business cycle. For those issuers where a strong correlation has not been evident, GDP is utilized as more of a pure scaling factor; for example, an assumption of a historically large GDP decline would result in the generation of “expected” issuer revenue performance that is weaker than the issuer has experienced historically.

More specifically, in response to a user-specified scenario for GDP (or another macro variable), the model generates both a point estimate and feasible range of percentage change in revenues. Analysts generally will use the point estimate in the scenario analysis but may deviate from this should there be a sufficient rationale for doing so. In such cases, the analyst will typically stay within the range produced by revenue sensitivity analysis, although in compelling cases, it may be possible to select a scenario level outside these bounds.

Fitch recognizes that historical data can reflect specific changes affecting an issuer’s revenue system, such as significant tax policy adjustments and/or location-specific economic changes. Time series information will be adjusted for the estimated impact of tax policy changes in all cases for state governments, using data reported annually by the National Conference of State Legislatures. For local governments, consistent adjustments generally are not possible, but analysts will incorporate such factors into the interpretation of results. Fitch will adjust the data for clearly identifiable and material accounting changes, such as the consolidation or disaggregation of operating funds that can be tracked by reviewing audited financial reports and have a notable impact on reported revenue trends.
The revenue sensitivity analysis theoretically has the capacity to consider any revenue stream, subject to careful interpretation of the results. As an input to the rating process, Fitch will evaluate tax revenues for state governments and total general fund revenues for local governments. Fitch believes those revenue streams highlight the main sources of operating fund revenue volatility for each. (For more information on revenue sensitivity analysis, see Appendix A.)

**Scenario Analysis**

Scenario analysis places the results generated by the revenue sensitivity analysis into a framework that allows Fitch to consistently consider and compare issuers’ ability to navigate through a downturn. It incorporates consideration of both an issuer’s inherent budget flexibility and its available reserves.

Fitch uses a three-year scenario, wherein U.S. GDP falls 1% in year one, followed by growth of 0.5% and 2% in years two and three. This is a less significant stress than experienced in the most recent recession. That downturn was particularly severe compared to historical norms, and Fitch does not believe it an appropriate basis for a rating scenario.

The 1% decline scenario is designed to represent a moderate economic downturn. Fitch may temporarily modify this scenario in a period of actual economic decline when it would not be meaningful to additionally stress an issuer’s financial position. Any such change would be communicated publicly and applied consistently from that point.

Fitch will use a revenue decline of no less than 1% as an input into the scenario analysis regardless of the actual revenue sensitivity results (some issuers will show a revenue increase in the scenario due to consistently strong performance in the 15-year time period that is the base for revenue sensitivity results). This recognizes the limits of the tool and the overarching goal of analyzing an issuer’s capacity to manage downturns.

The scenario analysis framework differs for local and state governments, with each discussed in more detail below. As noted, governments have three broad categories of financial flexibility to react to deterioration in economic conditions: revenue increases, expenditure cuts and use of reserves. States have substantial control over revenue raising and spending, while local governments have less control but in general a higher level of available reserves. As such, local scenario analysis is focused more on the maintenance of financial cushion in the form of reserves, whereas state scenario analysis is more oriented to comparisons of the level of budget shortfall that may need to be addressed in a downturn.

Despite differences in the specifics, both state and local scenario analyses are focused on expectations for how an issuer will manage through economic downturns and what effect that will have on the level of fundamental financial flexibility. This incorporates an assessment of both the tools that the government has to respond to downturns and which of these tools they are more or less likely to use.

In considering an issuer’s range of possible actions in the downturn scenario, Fitch recognizes that an issuer’s prior policy actions may, to varying degrees, be embedded in the historical results that inform the analysis. For example, if a local government’s revenue history reflects regular adjustment of property tax rates to offset declines in the base, historical revenue performance and revenue sensitivity results will show less downside risk than would exist in the absence of those actions. Analysts will take this into account in their assessments to avoid “double counting” policy alternatives.
Local Scenarios

Local scenario analysis begins with consideration of the impact of the three-year scenario revenue estimate (generated by FAST) on an issuer’s general fund position in the absence of any offsetting policy action. In cases where the issuer accounts for core operations or maintains reserves outside the general fund, adjustments will be made to the scenario, for example by replacing general fund data with combined operating fund data or adding reserves outside the general fund into fund balance figures.

Expenses are assumed to rise at a common rate meant to approximate inflation (assumed at 2%). Fitch notes that certain expenditures, such as those for social services, rise during economic downturns but believes this consistent and transparent assumption is adequate for purposes of the analysis.

FAST then puts the scenario-estimated change in revenues in context. Based on the issuer’s specific budget flexibility profile, the local scenario shows the amount of reserves that Fitch would consider a minimum financial cushion for a given financial resilience assessment level in the context of the scenario. This is referred to as the reserve safety margin.

Using this output as a base, the analyst considers how the issuer is likely to respond in such a scenario and whether that response would allow the issuer to maintain a financial position consistent with the current financial resilience assessment level. If the answer is no, this would suggest potential negative rating momentum, as the financial resilience assessment could be lowered.
The reserve safety margin is not a recommendation or a reflection of Fitch’s expectation of where reserves should or will be; it is merely a base level at which Fitch’s rating is expected to remain stable. Given the high level of resilience of most local governments’ reserves during the recent downturn, Fitch expects that actual reserve levels will often be far higher than the minimum indicated to keep the assessment stable.

Of note, FAST’s scenario output may show available financial cushion, in the form of fund balance, dropping below the reserve safety margin; however, the analyst may determine that, given the issuer’s budget management tools and demonstrated willingness to use them, the balance in fact would be maintained at the higher level. Expectations for what the issuer would do, as opposed to what they legally could do, are key to the analysis of financial resilience.

Fitch uses the unrestricted fund balance as a starting point in calculating an issuer’s financial cushion. Reserves outside the general fund are added if they are readily available for general use. In addition, restricted general fund balance may be considered available if the restriction is beyond the typical definitions under GASB Statement 54. For example, the state of North Carolina requires local governments to categorize most receivables as restricted fund balance, whereas in other states those items would be considered unrestricted. Conversely, the unrestricted fund balance may be reduced if there are other funds with accumulated deficits (most commonly internal service funds) that will eventually be eliminated with general fund resources.

Interpretation of scenario results will include consideration of policies that provide a cushion against revenue underperformance (e.g. budgeting only 95% of projected revenues).

### Calculation of Reserve Safety Margin

Fitch’s reserve expectations are credit and rating specific and recognize that reserve levels fluctuate throughout the economic cycle. To calculate the minimum financial cushion that Fitch considers sufficient for a given issuer and rating level in the context of the scenario, Fitch evaluates both the revenue decline that an issuer might experience in an economic downturn (in the form of FAST’s revenue sensitivity analysis output) and the issuer’s inherent flexibility to deal with that revenue decline through tax and spending control rather than reserves. Step 1 determines inherent budget flexibility based on the prior assessments of legal ability to raise revenues and flexibility of main expenditure items. Step 2 then determines a reserve safety margin consistent with a given assessment level based on this inherent budget flexibility and the scenario revenue decline, with the reserve level a multiple of the revenue decline.

To maintain the same level of financial flexibility, an issuer that is more likely to experience a steep drop in revenues in a downturn and/or one with less ability to respond through policy changes requires more cushion than one with less economically sensitive revenues and/or more control.

For example, if the revenue sensitivity analysis indicates a 4% scenario revenue decline, an entity with superior inherent budget flexibility will typically need an 8% unrestricted fund balance to be consistent with a ‘aaa’ assessment (i.e. 2.0x multiple in step 2 multiplied by the 4% revenue sensitivity analysis result), but one with only midrange gap-closing capacity would need a 20% cushion for the same assessment (i.e. 5.0x multiple in step 2 multiplied by 4%).
State Scenarios

The state scenario considers the impact of the three-year scenario on an issuer’s revenues and spending in the absence of any offsetting policy action, using the most recent available year as the starting point. Federal revenues, which are programmatic in nature, are isolated to better focus on areas under the states’ control.

As with the local scenarios, the revenue impact is estimated from the revenue sensitivity analysis, while expenses are assumed to rise at a consistent 2% rate. As noted, certain expenditures, such as those for social services, naturally rise during economic downturns, but Fitch believes this consistent and transparent assumption is adequate for purposes of the analysis.

The inherent budget flexibility of U.S. states is exceptional. U.S. state governments have extensive flexibility to control their finances at times of economic stress. In addition to unilateral authority to make structural revenue and spending decisions, states generally have extensive abilities to delay spending and/or accelerate revenues as well as broad access to one-time resources. As such, the level of reserves for most states is an important policy decision but not a key differentiating factor from a rating transition or probability of default perspective.

Therefore, Fitch does not set a minimum reserve level for state governments, in contrast to the expectations for local governments laid out above. This reflects not only states’ strong inherent budget flexibility but also that states can take action very quickly to respond to events; the tools available to local governments are less flexible and generally need more time to effectuate.

With this backdrop, the main purpose of state scenario analysis is to provide a relative sense of the risk exposure of a particular issuer compared to other states. State scenario analysis conveys the net change in fund balance in an unaddressed scenario and communicates how Fitch would expect the issuer to address the scenario gap between revenues and expenditures. If actual issuer performance is materially different from those assumptions, the financial resilience assessment could change.

**Step 1: Determining Inherent Budget Flexibility**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal Ability to Raise Revenues</th>
<th>Factor assessment</th>
<th>aaa</th>
<th>aa</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>bbb</th>
<th>bb</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Superior</td>
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<td>Midrange</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>a</td>
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<td>Limited</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

*Based on prior assessments.

**Step 2: Determining Reserve Safety Margin**

Multiples of the scenario revenue decline generated by revenue sensitivity analysis; the minimum reserve safety margin generated for the analysis is 2%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inherent Budget Flexibility</th>
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<th>aaa</th>
<th>aa</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>bbb</th>
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<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midrange</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minimal</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Not applicable (N.A.), because credits rated below investment grade are assumed to be in a situation in which either fund balance is already minimal to negative or any amount of fund balance in itself would be insufficient to keep the rating stable.
Interpretation of scenario results will include consideration of the state's explicit financial cushion readily available for budget balancing and any other policies that provide a cushion against revenue underperformance (e.g. budgeting only 95% of projected revenues). Although budget-basis analysis is a key focus for state assessments, in the interest of consistency the scenarios are based on GAAP-basis CAFR information.

State Government Scenario Analysis

Select a Issue:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario Parameters</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP Assumption (% Change)</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Assumption (% Change)</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue Outlook (% Change)</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Scenario Results:
If applicable, discuss factors embedded in the historical data that make the scenario appear materially more/fewer severe than baseline trend would dictate. For all discuss analyst’s expectations for how the issuer is likely to respond in the baseline trend scenario. These expectations should: (1) be consistent with prior assessments of revenue and expenditure flexibility and (2) serve as the basis for the assessment of financial resilience through downturns.

Revenues, Expenditures, and Net Change in Fund Balance

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Expenditures</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Expenditures</td>
<td>4,642,725</td>
<td>4,680,230</td>
<td>5,211,222</td>
<td>5,773,245</td>
<td>6,230,535</td>
<td>6,614,532</td>
<td>6,524,630</td>
<td>6,138,899</td>
<td>6,453,371</td>
<td>6,580,144</td>
<td>6,077,271</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Expenditures</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change in State Expenditures</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>-11.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenues</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Revenues</td>
<td>5,130,022</td>
<td>5,155,093</td>
<td>5,650,870</td>
<td>5,924,795</td>
<td>5,630,309</td>
<td>6,270,584</td>
<td>6,384,352</td>
<td>6,870,596</td>
<td>7,004,373</td>
<td>6,927,147</td>
<td>7,923,532</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Total Revenues</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Federal Revenues</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Change in State Revenues</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>-3.6%</td>
<td>-15.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excess of Revenues Over Expenditures</td>
<td>467,507</td>
<td>265,166</td>
<td>350,678</td>
<td>274,515</td>
<td>324,086</td>
<td>619,095</td>
<td>650,460</td>
<td>706,707</td>
<td>690,380</td>
<td>604,703</td>
<td>593,729</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Total Excess</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Other Financing Sources</td>
<td>-243,164</td>
<td>-221,607</td>
<td>-203,171</td>
<td>-193,098</td>
<td>-192,071</td>
<td>-174,322</td>
<td>-163,950</td>
<td>-152,098</td>
<td>-141,256</td>
<td>-130,414</td>
<td>-119,572</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent Change in Total Other Financing Sources</td>
<td>-6.0%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Net Change in Fund Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Actual</td>
<td>467,507</td>
<td>265,166</td>
<td>350,678</td>
<td>274,515</td>
<td>324,086</td>
<td>619,095</td>
<td>650,460</td>
<td>706,707</td>
<td>690,380</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Net Change in Fund Balance</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Scenario analysis represents an unaddressed stress on issuer’s finances. Fitch’s downward/market scenarios assume a 0.5% GDP decline in the first year, followed by 0.5% and a 2.0% GDP growth in Years 2 and 3, respectively. Expenditures are assumed to remain a 2.0% rate of inflation. For further details, please see Fitch’s U.S. Tax-Supported Rating Criteria.
Section 2: Determining Ratings for Specific Securities

The first part of the criteria covers how Fitch establishes the general credit quality, as expressed through the IDR, for a U.S. state or local government. This section details how ratings are assigned to specific securities based on the legal structure and relationship to the IDR of the related government.

The vast majority of tax-supported bonds is backed by GO, appropriation or dedicated tax pledges. Fitch’s approach to rating each of these is discussed in more detail below.

If a debt obligation carries two pledges, Fitch does not necessarily consider the two pledges to be additive. For example, if in Fitch’s view one of the pledges does not provide a substantial or reliable source of revenue relative to debt service, such as a pledge of revenue from a project that is yet to be completed, the rating will be based on the stronger pledge. Similarly, for bonds carrying both a GO and a dedicated tax pledge, the rating will be no higher than the stronger of the two, typically the GO.

General Obligation Bonds

Ratings on GO bonds are generally the same as the issuing government’s IDR. The GO full faith and credit pledge is the broadest commitment a state or local government can provide and, therefore, reflective of the government’s fundamental creditworthiness. In cases where the government issues both ULTGO and LTGO bonds, Fitch generally assigns the same rating, equal to the IDR, to each security. In Fitch’s opinion, the presence of an unlimited tax pledge may provide modest additional budget flexibility compared to a limited tax pledge in cases where operating tax rates are limited but in and of itself does not increase the likelihood of full and timely payment of debt service.

There are two notable exceptions to the practice of linking the IDR to the GO rating, both related to local government issuers and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The first exception is for cases in which Fitch concludes that the pledged tax revenues would be considered special revenues in a bankruptcy under section 902(2) of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The second is cases in which Fitch believes the likelihood of enhanced recovery prospects can be identified and should be reflected in the security rating. Both of these exceptions are discussed in more detail later in the criteria.

Fitch’s local government ratings make no distinction between entities in states that allow for local government bankruptcies and those that do not. Only 24 of the 50 states currently allow local governments to file for bankruptcy under Chapter 9, but Fitch believes that, if a state deemed an entity’s best option to be a filing, the state would make the legal provisions necessary for that entity to file.

Appropriation-Backed Bonds

Lease and other appropriation-supported obligations require appropriation by the governing body for debt service to be paid. The three debt structures associated with lease/appropriation debt rated by Fitch are: covenant to budget and appropriate debt in which the covenant is an ongoing and enforceable obligation of the issuer (covenant to budget and appropriate [CB&A]); debt secured by obligor payments subject to annual appropriation (annual appropriation debt); and lease debt in which lease payments can be reduced if the leased assets are not fully available for use (abatement lease debt).
Appropriation-backed bonds are generally rated one notch below the obligor’s IDR, reflecting the slightly higher degree of optionality associated with lease/appropriation payments compared to the IDR. Fitch believes the incentive and propensity to repay lease/appropriation debt is closely linked to an obligor’s incentive and propensity to repay all debt. Most creditworthy issuers/obligors view lease/appropriation debt as part of their debt portfolio and have strong incentives to pay to preserve overall credit quality and maintain cost effective access to the capital markets despite the inherent option for non-appropriation.

This reasoning applies as well to abatement leases, which allow for but do not require offset to rent in certain circumstances. Fitch does not reflect abatement risk in additional notching from the IDR. Fitch believes that the issuer will repay such debt even if it technically has the option not to do so, whether through non-appropriation or abatement. Abatement rises to an additional rating consideration in the event that the issuer is expressly barred from making debt service payments during an abatement event. In those cases, mitigants to abatement risk, such as reserve funds and insurance protections, will be evaluated in the legal structure.

Ratings more than one notch below the IDR may be assigned when Fitch identifies additional risk features. Specifically, the rating approach may differ in the following cases:

- The debt service is payable solely from a narrow or volatile revenue source. In such cases, analysis will likely focus on expectations for underlying revenue performance and less on the appropriation risk.
- The obligor’s budgets and financial plans reflect the expectation that debt service will be repaid by a source that Fitch regards as uncertain, such as revenue generated by an enterprise or project that has not proven self-sufficiency, even if a broader pool of revenues is legally available.
- Bond proceeds fund economic development or entertainment projects where attainment of the expected benefits has yet to be realized or is otherwise precarious.

Lease obligations for lower rated credits (‘BBB’ or lower) may also be rated multiple notches below the IDR when the incentives to opt out of the lease obligation are heightened.

In contrast, if the incentive for appropriation is judged to be significantly enhanced (e.g. through a statutory mechanism that traps substantial operating funds if appropriation is not made), the appropriation debt can be rated on par with the obligor’s IDR. However, Fitch is likely to make a rating distinction even in such cases for lower rated credits when competition among interests may develop. In addition, the rating would consider the appropriation history of the obligor in relation to debt structured with such mechanisms.

Certain bonds are not directly issued by a given government as appropriation-backed debt but are supported by payments by that government subject to annual appropriation, either directly for debt service or to replenish a deficiency in the debt service reserve fund (DSRF). If the structure provides for full and timely payment of debt service pursuant to the appropriation, Fitch considers these securities similar to annual appropriation/lease bonds.

The rating approach for appropriation-backed bonds, in conjunction with the general government’s IDR, can be used to determine IDRs for divisions of government or other public-sector entities, government agencies or authorities in certain cases. For example, the approach can be applied to a U.S. state department of transportation entering into a public-private partnership obligation.

For the appropriation rating methodology to apply in such cases, Fitch looks for a high degree of integration into the general government structure, a record of financial support by the general government, general government control over the entity’s activities and a core public-
sector mission. The degree of notching is based on consideration of the nature of the relationship between the entity and the sponsor government; the more integrated, the less notching down from the general government IDR, all else being equal. Given the degree of linkage that Fitch would look for to apply the appropriation-backed approach to such entities, a difference of no more than three notches would be expected.

**Dedicated Tax Bonds**

Dedicated tax bonds are defined by Fitch as bonds payable from a specific tax revenue stream but not covered by a GO pledge. These include bonds backed by sales, income, transportation and hotel tax revenues, as well as tax increment financing (TIF) or tax allocation bonds and bonds supported by property-based special assessments or payments in lieu of taxes.

Dedicated tax bonds are evaluated in a two-step process, both on a stand-alone basis and for their exposure to the operating risk of the issuing entity as expressed in its IDR. The stand-alone analysis may result in a rating lower than the issuing entity’s IDR. Alternatively, it may suggest a rating higher than the issuing entity’s IDR, but this is subject to a cap where appropriate pursuant to the step 2 analysis.

**Step 1: Stand-Alone Analysis**

The stand-alone analysis builds on the foundation of the IDR framework outlined in Section 1 but considers only those factors that are relevant to the specific dedicated tax security. As the direct credit risk for a dedicated tax bond relates to the performance of the revenue stream over time, Fitch evaluates: the drivers of and growth prospects for the dedicated revenue stream, its sensitivity to cyclical decline and the resilience of the security through such declines.

The analysis of growth prospects for revenues is consistent with the approach used for IDR analysis. Historical performance compared to national economic growth is the starting point, with additional consideration of factors that may influence future behavior of the revenue system.

If the obligor has the mandate to raise the tax rate, if needed, this can positively affect the assessment of the quality of the revenue stream. Conversely, if the issuer can diminish the tax rate or base, Fitch incorporates this into the analysis and considers the protections provided through non-impairment covenants. For Fitch to rate a dedicated tax bond investment grade, the tax authorization must extend at least to the final bond maturity date, unless the issuer agrees to put sufficient funds in an irrevocable trustee-held escrow prior to the bond closing to cover debt service after the tax expiration date.

To evaluate the sensitivity of the dedicated revenue stream to cyclical decline, Fitch considers both revenue sensitivity results (using the same 1% decline in national GDP scenario that supports assessments in the IDR framework) and the largest decline in revenues over the period covered by the revenue sensitivity analysis.

If a pledged revenue stream is recently authorized, there may be no or insufficient historical data with which to perform these analyses. In these cases, Fitch seeks to use a proxy such as revenues from an existing tax levied on a similar base or data on the economic activity that directly generates the pledged revenue. For example, if a new sales tax is authorized in an area that has an existing sales tax levied on a substantially equivalent base, Fitch will evaluate the history of the existing tax. If no sales tax previously existed, Fitch might use historical taxable retail sales if they provide a reasonably direct relationship to pledged revenue behavior.
In cases where no reasonable proxy for historical revenues exists, Fitch will not be able to provide a dedicated tax bond rating.

General expectations for protection against both the scenario decline and the worst performance over the period being evaluated provide a consistent basis for assessing the resilience of the security through economic declines.

Analysis focuses on coverage of maximum annual debt service (MADS), incorporating Fitch’s expectations for issuance under the bonding program over time, rather than on current coverage levels that may be materially higher. In many cases, this will assume issuance up to the minimum coverage required by the additional bonds test (ABT), which is the legal leverage protection provided to bondholders. However, if Fitch is confident that coverage will be maintained at a higher level (e.g. due to operating requirements funded from residual dedicated tax revenues), the rating will reflect that higher level of expected coverage.

As in the IDR framework, the level of coverage cushion that Fitch considers consistent with a given rating level is a function of the risk profile of the dedicated revenue stream. Fitch has established expectations, summarized in the table above, for coverage cushion at different rating levels. The first represents a multiple of the scenario revenue decline indicated by the revenue sensitivity analysis. The second represents a multiple of the largest single actual revenue decline (whether in a single fiscal year or across fiscal years). Fitch considers both levels of cushion when assigning ratings.

These expectations are for the level of cushion that current revenues provide for MADS. For example, if the revenue sensitivity analysis for a given revenue stream shows a 5% decline in the downturn scenario, Fitch would look for the structure to be able to withstand a decline of 40% at the ‘aaa’ level (i.e. 5% revenue sensitivity output multiplied by the 8.0x coverage multiple in the table above), 30% at ‘aa’ (5% multiplied by 6.0), 20% at ‘a’ (5% multiplied by 4.0), and 7.5% at ‘bbb’ (5% multiplied by 1.5).

In the same example, if the largest actual revenue decline was 15%, Fitch would look for a cushion of at least a 45% for ‘aaa’ (i.e., 15% multiplied by 3.0), dropping to 18.75% for ‘bbb’ (15% multiplied by 1.25). For a given assessment level, Fitch would look for coverage to meet the higher of the two thresholds.

Interpreting results based on current revenues to assess the resilience of the security, the analysis considers the current point in the economic cycle. Analysis also incorporates the debt service schedule and the difference in both the dollar amount and time between the current year and MADS. A structure where MADS is far in the future and the nature of the revenue stream makes it likely to grow over time, including due to the benefit of inflation for a revenue such as a sales tax, requires comparatively less coverage from current revenues. The analysis of all historical data also incorporates consideration of whether non-recurring events in the time series skew results; in such cases, this informs Fitch’s assessment of the strength of the financial cushion.

Coverage expectations linked to revenue sensitivity results are consistent with Fitch’s reserve safety margin expectations for a general government issuer that has minimal inherent budget flexibility (discussed further on page 20), because in the majority of dedicated tax bond

### Expectations for MADS Coverage

| Multiples of decline from -1% GDP revenue sensitivity analysis |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| aaaa | aa | a | bbb |
| 8.0x | 6.0x | 4.0x | 1.5x |

| Multiples of the largest actual revenue decline in review period |
|----------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| aaaa | aa | a | bbb |
| 3.0x | 2.5x | 2.0x | 1.25x |
securities, there is no ability to raise tax rates or reduce expenditures (i.e. debt service). In the same way, the coverage cushion need only cover revenue risk rather than operating risk, resulting in coverage expectations that are half of those in the reserve safety margin calculation.

As in the IDR framework, a negative factor that can hold down the rating would be outlier cases where the nature of the dedicated tax base makes it susceptible to an unpredictable change in profile (e.g. industry concentration). Fitch also considers the outstanding variable-rate debt of a dedicated tax security as part of the rating process, with credit concerns primarily focused on the potential for liabilities related to unexpected termination of any related swap agreements.

Rating distinctions between senior and subordinate lien dedicated tax bonds are generally based on notably weaker debt service coverage and legal protections for subordinate bonds provided by the indenture. Fitch only makes such distinctions in cases where there are no cross-default provisions between the liens. Fitch will likely not make a rating distinction between senior and subordinate liens in situations where the dedicated tax bond rating is capped at an IDR below the level that would otherwise be warranted based on the tax revenue stream alone (see Step 2 section below).

Fitch does not have specific expectations for the funding of a DSRF but considers whether there is liquidity within the structure commensurate with the rating assigned to the bonds. A DSRF may be important in situations where liquidity is a concern based on the fundamentals and performance of the revenue stream and/or the level of debt service coverage. Where relevant, the credit given to a DSRF funded with a surety bond will be determined in accordance with Fitch’s structured finance counterparty criteria.

**Step 2: Analysis of Exposure to Issuing Entity Operations**

The second step of the dedicated tax bond analysis considers the extent to which bondholder security can be threatened by the operating risk of the related government as expressed in its IDR. If Fitch believes that there is exposure, the rating on the dedicated tax bond security is capped at the IDR. This is primarily a factor for bonds issued by local governments, which can declare bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. States do not have this option, and therefore, the legal considerations for a dedicated tax bond issued by a state are more limited.

**State Government Issuers**

The rating of a dedicated tax bond issued by a state may be higher than the state IDR, although this is uncommon because state IDRs tend to be at or above the level that any stand-alone analysis of a dedicated tax bond would support due to states’ inherent credit strengths. To achieve a rating higher than the IDR, the flow of the pledged revenue must be structurally protected from the state’s general financial operations.

The mechanisms to achieve this structural protection vary by state and may include constitutional provisions that prevent the pledged revenues from entering the state general fund until after payment of debt service, or by statutory provisions that accomplish the same end. Such legal structures may include express language or covenants stating the state will not take actions that would impair the security provided to bondholders.

Although contract clause protections under federal and state constitutions restrict the ability of a state government to impair its obligation to pay bondholders from the dedicated tax, the contract clause does not impose an absolute constraint when there is a fiscal emergency. Therefore, the amount of credit Fitch will give to such a structure is tempered by the risk that a
state, faced with extreme financial stress, could exercise its sovereign powers to the detriment of bondholders.

**Local Government Issuers**

Bankruptcy risk to local governments generally precludes dedicated tax bonds issued by that government from being rated higher than the entity's IDR, regardless of the strength of the security. Fitch considers four exceptions where a dedicated tax bond rating above the IDR is possible: (1) bondholders are granted a lien on and pledge of revenue that Fitch concludes would be considered special revenues under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code; (2) the debt is issued pursuant to a specific state intercept program (see Appendix C); (3) the debt is structured as a securitization specifically authorized by state law; or (4) Fitch can identify the likelihood of enhanced recovery prospects. The legal structure supporting a rating above the IDR will also provide that the dedicated tax revenue is directly deposited into a fund distinct and separate from the entity's general fund, although it may be collected by the local government (with exceptions noted below).

For special taxing entities that are related to a broader government, such as a library or park district, Fitch evaluates whether the special district would constitute a separate “municipality” distinct from the broader government for purposes of the Code. Where Fitch believes that the entity may be a unit or department of government but not clearly a separate “municipality” under Chapter 9, the rating applied to debt of the entity would be capped at the IDR of the broader government of which it is a part unless the pledged revenue is clearly “special revenue” under Chapter 9 of the Code. Tax-supported enterprises that constitute separate municipalities will be rated on the basis of their independent characteristics.

**Special Revenues**

Bonds backed by pledged special revenues, as defined in section 902(2) of the Code, offer the following unique protections to bondholders. These support ratings that are distinct and potentially higher than the IDR and ratings on bonds backed by the issuer's general revenues.

- A simple consensual lien on special revenues would be permitted to survive post-bankruptcy.
- Exemption from the automatic stay provisions of the Code would allow continuous payment on special revenue-backed obligations uninterrupted by a bankruptcy filing by a municipality.

Under Chapter 9, “municipalities” include general purpose local governments as well as operating entities such as school districts, transit districts and other limited scope governmental units.

Section 902(2) defines five types of special revenues. The first four types are relatively self-evident: (A) receipts from operation of a utility or transportation system; (B) special excise taxes on particular activities (such as liquor and hotel taxes); (C) tax increment revenues; and (D) revenues or receipts from particular functions of the debtor (such as vehicle license and deed recordation fees). Fitch does not believe specific legal advice is generally required to evaluate the application of these provisions and rate the special revenue debt distinct from and potentially higher than IDR of the related municipality.

Less direct structures such as revenue-sharing programs based on excise taxes created at the state level may be considered special revenues under Section 902(2)(B) of the Code as they originate as an excise tax. Programs vary by state, and the transfer to the municipality may be subject to revision and appropriation. Those features do not change the nature of the excise
taxes as special revenues, although they can result in other limits on the rating as state appropriation-backed debt.

The fifth definition of special revenues — 902(2)(E) — attempts to distinguish between property, sales and income taxes supporting project debt and such taxes funding the general purposes of the municipality. Fitch sets a high bar for recognizing special revenue status under this final definition, which is ambiguous and could be interpreted as covering many tax-supported bonds.

To rate debt above the general credit of a related municipality, Fitch believes the case for special revenue status must be very clear. The boundaries of the special revenue designation under Section 902(2)(E) have rarely been subject to adjudication, and the stakes of misclassification are high. Legal opinions serve as the foundation for rating such bonds above the IDR and Fitch analyzes the overall legal framework to ensure it robustly supports the legal conclusion.

Fitch believes the following elements must be present to sufficiently reduce the incentive to challenge a bond’s special revenue status under 902(2)(E) in a bankruptcy. Each of these elements is necessary for Fitch to have sufficient comfort to provide a rating based on the pledged revenues’ status as special revenues:

- A statutory scheme limiting the authority to levy a specific tax to the financing of capital projects.
- An express statutory prohibition on use of any revenues from the taxes for operations of the municipality, unless Fitch has a reasonable legal basis by which to determine that the pledged revenues would not be subordinated to operating expenses in a bankruptcy. If any residual revenues can be used for the entity’s operations and are at risk of being subject to netting, Fitch will consider them to be general revenues and rate the issue as unsecured debt).
- An identification of specific capital projects in a ballot initiative or in a resolution limiting the use of proceeds of the debt to those capital projects; for refunding bonds, it should be clear that the bonds being refunded meet this criterion.
- A structure in which bondholders do not have a claim on general revenues of the municipality, where the bonds are solely secured by a dedicated tax (general obligation bonds supported by the entity’s full faith and credit will typically not meet this criterion).
- A statutory requirement that a governmental official outside the municipality (e.g. the county) collects and remits the tax revenues to the paying agent, placing the funds outside the control and direction of the municipality.
- Clarity that the pledged taxes are property of the municipality and would not be considered at any point the property of the entity collecting and remitting the tax revenues; absent this, the rating would be capped at the collector’s rating.

In cases where the dedicated tax revenues need to be appropriated by the issuing entity or another level of government to be available for debt service, Fitch places a rating cap on the dedicated tax bonds based on the appropriation-backed debt rating methodology discussed above.

**Bank Bonds**

In conjunction with or subsequent to a borrower’s issuance of variable-rate demand bonds (VRDBs), Fitch may be asked to assign a long-term rating to the borrower’s corresponding bank bonds, e.g. VRDBs that have been tendered and not remarketed, and then purchased by the liquidity provider in accordance with the liquidity support agreement. Fitch bases this rating
on its analysis of the underlying credit strength of the issue, taking into consideration the potential negative effects of a purchase of the bonds by the bank, which may include a ramp-up in the interest rate and an accelerated repayment of principal.

Since these factors are considered in Fitch’s analysis of the underlying rating of all parity debt, including any VRDOs, bank bonds whose security is on parity with their corresponding VRDOs carry the same underlying long-term rating as those VRDOs. Similarly, an obligation arising from commercial paper being purchased by a liquidity provider would be assigned the same rating as the issuer’s parity obligations.

**Recovery and Fitch’s U.S. Tax-Supported Ratings**

Fitch’s tax-supported ratings consider an obligation’s relative vulnerability to default and generally do not incorporate any measure of recovery given default. However, there are two discrete circumstances in which Fitch believes the likelihood of enhanced recovery prospects can be reliably identified and should be reflected in local government security ratings above the IDR as additional information to investors when considering relative risks.

**Statutory Liens**

The first case where Fitch accounts for recoveries in its ratings is a municipal security that benefits from a substantial preferential right in a bankruptcy proceeding as a result of a statutory lien being granted under state law.

A statutory lien is defined in Section 101(53) of the Code as a lien arising automatically by force of statute on specified circumstances or conditions. This lien is in contrast to a consensual lien (or security interest [defined in Section 101(51) of the Code]), in which a lien is created by agreement, where both parties to a financing agree to a certain security structure and document that agreement in an indenture or loan document. Some state laws also provide that a consensual lien agreed to by a municipality can be perfected or becomes enforceable without further actions or filings. Such laws govern perfection of security interests and are not statutory liens that Fitch would consider when evaluating enhanced recovery prospects.

The statutory lien preserves bondholder rights to tax revenues securing the tax-backed bond received by the municipality after it enters bankruptcy court. In contrast, the security interest of bondholders that have a consensual lien in pledged general revenues of a municipality, but no statutory lien, ends with respect to subsequently collected tax revenues once the bankruptcy proceeding begins.

Although the automatic stay provisions of the Code preclude enforcement of the statutory lien when the municipality files, the holder of a statutory lien is entitled to recover the value of the lien in the bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, the property subject to the lien may not be diverted to general use by the municipality unless the holder of the statutory lien is given adequate protection against the erosion of the value of the lien and the holder can seek relief from the stay if the value of the lien is being diminished. Although the determination of value is not detailed in the Code and discount methodology can result in recovery below 100%, recovery values will be substantially higher than an unsecured credit that competes with other general claimants, including pensioners and employee benefit plans, for a claim on the municipality’s revenues.

As a result of the robust protection afforded bondholders benefiting from a statutory lien in a bankruptcy, Fitch will rate bonds backed by revenues with a statutory lien for bondholders one to two notches higher than the equivalent stream without the statutory lien.
Fitch will provide notching above the IDR where an evaluation of the statute by counsel provides a reasonable basis to conclude that it clearly applies to the particular revenues and the related obligation. Fitch expects that broad-based laws that cover issuers of a defined type of debt in a state will allow for recovery enhancement to be applied to ratings of such issuers generally, once the agency is provided with the necessary legal evaluation of the broad-based statute and its effects in a Chapter 9 proceeding.

In addition to the validity of the statutory lien, Fitch will consider the point at which the lien attaches. The lien should apply to the specified revenue at or near the point of collection to add to credit quality. If the lien does not attach until the revenues are deposited by the municipality with a trustee shortly before the bond repayment date, the lien may not provide rating enhancement because it might only benefit bondholders if the issuer happens to file for bankruptcy within the window between the deposit and the bond repayment. These are state law issues that will need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis.

**Extent of Notching**

The determinant of the notching above the IDR depends on the strength and level of coverage provided by the pledged revenues. ULTGO bonds with a statutory lien will be rated two notches above the IDR, because the strength of the pledge provides inherently greater pledged revenues than other types of tax-supported bonds.

A statutory lien is sometimes provided to support a limited obligation debt such as a dedicated tax bond. In some cases, the revenue supporting such debt will constitute special revenues under Chapter 9 of the Code. Ratings on special revenue bond debt do not incorporate a notching for recovery, as they are not limited by the IDR. The typical dedicated tax bond will not constitute special revenues. Such debt will have pledged revenues that are nearly always subject to a rate limitation, providing somewhat weaker debt service coverage than the ULTGO debt.

When the general characteristics of a dedicated tax bond with a statutory lien are strong and the municipality’s IDR reflects a modest to moderate level of operating risk, the bond may be rated one notch above the IDR based on recovery considerations. When the municipality’s IDR reflects more than a moderate level of operating risk, the dedicated tax bond rating may also be two notches above. For example, if a municipality whose IDR is ‘BBB+’ has dedicated tax bonds outstanding with a statutory lien on broad-based pledged revenues, a sound additional bonds test and solid actual and projected coverage, the rating on the dedicated tax bonds would likely be ‘A,’ the same as for the issuer’s ULTGO bond with a statutory lien.

The approach to rating appropriation-backed debt is not affected by this statutory lien analysis.

**Visibility During Bankruptcy**

The second set of circumstances in which recovery can be identified and reflected in ratings includes those securities for which there is sufficient visibility on the potential recovery prospects during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding. Unlike the equivalent approach in corporate ratings, no analysis of liquidation values will be considered as the municipality will always emerge as a going concern with adjusted liabilities. Fitch does not expect to come to an independent opinion on the recovery value of a pledged municipal asset under a lease transaction.

Initial filings and response in a municipal bankruptcy are unlikely to provide sufficient visibility to allow for recovery rating enhancement as these often will express opening negotiating
positions not considered assessments of value. Visibility would likely come in a plan of adjustment, which would be informed by discussions with creditors.

Individual filings can be complex and idiosyncratic, with outcomes subject to negotiation with multiple parties. Fitch will evaluate individual cases as they occur rather than developing general rules for notching if bankruptcy becomes a reality.

**Variations from Criteria**

Fitch’s criteria are designed to be used in conjunction with experienced analytical judgment exercised through a committee process. The combination of transparent criteria, analytical judgment applied on a transaction-by-transaction or issuer-by-issuer basis, and full disclosure via rating commentary strengthens Fitch’s rating process while assisting market participants in understanding the analysis behind our ratings.

A rating committee may adjust the application of these criteria to reflect the risks of a specific transaction or entity. Such adjustments are called variations. All variations will be disclosed in the respective rating action commentaries, including their impact on the rating where appropriate.

A variation can be approved by a ratings committee where the risk, feature, or other factor relevant to the assignment of a rating and the methodology applied to it are both included within the scope of the criteria, but where the analysis described in the criteria requires modification to address factors specific to the particular transaction or entity.

**Data Sources**

Fitch’s analysis and rating decisions are based on relevant information available to its analysts. Sources of this information include the issuer and/or the obligor, public domain and the financial advisor if a financial advisor has been engaged. Sources also include relevant publicly available information on the issuer, such as financial statements and regulatory filings. The rating process may also incorporate information provided by other third-party sources. If this other third-party information is material to the rating, the specific rating action will disclose the relevant source.
Appendix A: Revenue Sensitivity Analysis/Scenario Revenue Estimates

The purpose of the revenue sensitivity analysis (RSA) estimates generated by FAST is to provide broad order of magnitude guidance of how state and local governments’ revenues may be affected in relation to the general macroeconomic/cyclical scenario specified. The tool then allows for scenario analysis based on the revenue output. FAST is not a forecasting tool, but rather provides a plausible range of outcomes that can be evaluated in a through-the-cycle analysis. The RSA generates a revenue estimate that is empirically based, objective and intuitive and allows for uniformity/consistency in terms of the input variable being stressed (e.g. GDP). It also provides a means for better understanding how an issuer’s revenues have evolved over the cycle and relative to peers.

For the majority of states, changes in the broader economy alone can explain a very large part of the changes in tax revenues for a given year. Relatively few local issuers evidence a strong correlation of changes in revenues to the economy, though a considerable majority of the largest single-year and multiyear declines in local government revenues over the past two decades occurred during or shortly following recessions or cyclically weak periods.

Given the relatively low correlation of the change in issuer revenues to the change in broad economic indicators for many local issuers especially, as well as the significant percentage of low revenue years that occurred during the comparatively moderate downturn of 2001–2002, the RSA utilizes a multipronged approach that incorporates both a basic econometric approach, when a significant correlation for that issuer is evident, and an alternative methodology.

Although some forecasting techniques are used to derive the scenario estimate, this exercise is definitively not that but rather a sensitivity analysis designed to produce a meaningful approximation of the order of magnitude impact on revenues for the specific scenario chosen, with a qualitative overlay. For any particular issuer, where a significant correlation to the broader economy is not evident, the revenue estimate relies exclusively on the alternative approach, which relaxes the statistical assumptions embedded in econometrics. In such instances, GDP should be thought of more as simply a scaling factor rather than indicating a significant tie to the broader economy.

Additionally, underlying data can present challenges. For all issuers, the RSA controls for extreme outliers, and analysts perform a qualitative review of the historical data used in the generation of output. Available history, coverage, general quality and incorporation (or not) of tax-policy change effects all must be considered when interpreting the output generated by the RSA.

Methodologies Utilized

The following methodologies are used to gauge the percentage change in revenues for a given scenario assumption.

Econometric Approach

This approach utilizes a regression model unique to each issuer, where the change in GDP (or another macro indicator, if selected) is the independent variable, and the percentage change in annual government revenues is the dependent variable. The optimal GDP lag or lead is determined, with the best fit model subjected to various tests to assess statistical validity, including utilizing cutoffs with regard to minimum explanatory power, coefficient significance,
data normality and other factors such as serial correlation. Should the specific issuer model meet the requisite hurdles, the results (percentage change in revenues) for the specified GDP level are utilized in the analysis; otherwise, they are discarded.

Even for the states and local governments with revenue performance most correlated to GDP, Fitch acknowledges that this methodology will likely never equal the accuracy provided by other techniques, such as a multivariate approach, where multiple independent variables are utilized and, in particular, where the model is more customized to a specific issuer. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this exercise, where the objective is to gauge only the approximate order of magnitude impact and where having a more customized approach may run counter to the goal of having a uniformly applied stress across the portfolio.

**Interpolation Approach**

In some ways, the interpolation approach can be thought of a short-cut version of the econometric approach, where only two key data points are utilized to form a “best fit” line and statistical assumptions have been relaxed. The higher point \((x, y)\) in this analysis is defined by the average year experience (average percentage change in GDP, compound annual average percentage change in issuer revenues) over the calibration period (period of data utilized to determine model parameters), while the lower point represents the worst year experience (low year percentage change in GDP, low year percentage change in specific issuer revenues, regardless of whether these occurred the same year or not) over the calibration period. Determining the scenario change in issuer revenues is a simple interpolation exercise between these two points using the scenario GDP change as the \(x\) coordinate. (Note that a through-the-cycle analysis would generally be expected to utilize a cyclical decline between the worst and average year experience.)

**Point Estimate/Range Determination**

While this is definitively not a forecasting exercise, the range around the point estimate (average of the interpolation and econometric approaches if the latter is available, otherwise just the interpolation approach) is calculated in the same manner as an ordinary confidence interval utilizing the standard error of estimate (SE) from the econometric approach. The objective of the interval is to give a reasonable, but not excessive, degree of latitude to the analysts in a systematic way rather than capturing, for example, the vast majority of the outcomes expected for a given change in GDP. Consequently, the range generated would likely be relatively narrow, typically less than \(+/- 1 SE\) from the point estimate.

Appendix B: School Districts

Fitch’s IDR for school districts are derived using the framework outlined in Section 1. This appendix provides additional information on how the framework is applied to school districts, as they have certain unique features compared to general purpose governments.

State Context

Education is fundamentally a state responsibility that is provided at the local government level. As such, Fitch considers state constitutional and statutory requirements, policies, practices, regulations and oversight, as well as the state’s overall financial position and expectations for school funding, as a common starting point for the analysis of all school districts in a given state. With this as the base, the credit quality of an individual school district is then determined by analyzing the impact of the state on the district and financial decisions by the school district within the state context.

There is no direct relationship between the state’s IDR and the ratings of school districts within the state. The significant information for school districts is Fitch’s expectations for state school funding and policy.

Economic Base

Fitch believes that analysis of an issuer’s economic base is critical to the assessment of prospects for revenue growth, spending demands, the affordability of liabilities and the ability of an issuer to balance revenue and spending over time. A school district’s revenues generally come from a combination of its own economic resources and the state’s school funding regime. A district’s spending and liability position also can be heavily influenced by the state. As such, the analysis of school district credit involves more directed consideration of the local economy than is the case for general purpose governments.

Aspects of the local economy that are significant to the analysis of a school district credit will be influenced by the specifics of the state; however, since state funding is usually determined by formula on a per pupil basis, the district’s population and enrollment trends and projections are almost always the most important consideration related to a school district’s local economy. This analysis incorporates actual and potential competition from charter and private schools.

States typically dictate a certain amount of per-pupil funding for operations (from combined state and local sources). The aggregate per-pupil amount may vary from year to year but is usually not affected by changes in the local tax base’s ability to generate property tax revenue. Such equalization efforts reduce the analytical importance of a weak, less affluent local economy, as districts in such locations benefit from larger amounts of state financial support.

The strongest credits will be those with stable to modestly growing enrollment in states with a solid track record of consistent per-pupil funding levels. School districts in regions of healthy job and population growth with limited risk of competition from private or charter schools can be expected to maintain stable to moderate growth in enrollment and enrollment-related funding. Stagnant or declining population and/or enrollment is a source of credit concern.

Revenue Framework

For school districts, the assessment of growth prospects for revenues is heavily influenced by not just historical performance but also the state-level analysis and district-specific enrollment trends and expectations. Fitch’s analysis also incorporates changes in state education funding
policy and distribution methods. For example, a state may change its funding policy to direct increased allocations to poorer and urban districts or charter schools.

State-determined funding is typically a district’s primary revenue driver, even if the majority of revenue is derived from the local tax base. Fitch recognizes that K–12 education is fundamentally a state responsibility and has observed that, while state funding levels will continue to fluctuate for various reasons, the strong foundation of support for this activity provides a measure of stability and predictability that is significant to rating determinations. For districts with weaker and/or narrow local economies, the existence of state funding provides a boost and adds diversity to the resource base, whereas for districts with wealthy and/or very stable economies, reliance on state funding formulae can be a limiting resource factor.

Most school districts have limited, if any, independent ability to raise revenues materially without external approval. In some states, school districts can raise operating revenues only through a voter referendum, and in some cases, districts do not even have that option. This limitation is not as significant a factor in the assessment of a school district’s revenue framework as would be the case for a general purpose government given the state funding dynamic discussed above.

**Expenditure Framework**

Enrollment and salary and benefit costs related to teachers are the main drivers of school district expenditures. Special education can also be a significant cost driver. As with general governments, school districts generally provide a base level of service that is well above legal requirements, if any.

In some ways, the distance between current spending and minimum requirements is easier to assess for school districts than for other types of government due to the districts’ limited purpose. Examples of legal service-level requirements include a specified number of school days (or hours) and class size maximums by grade level set at the state level. Fitch considers a district’s proximity to such requirements as well as other areas of service-level flexibility, such as instructional aides or administrative employees. Fitch believes these are easier to scale back than classroom teachers and spending on core programs.

A distinguishing feature of school district operations compared to those of general purpose governments is that, in numerous cases, states provide support for debt service costs. Fitch does not include debt service that is subsidized by the state in the analysis of the district’s carrying costs, as it places no burden on the district’s budget. Similarly, school districts in some states benefit from state contributions to state-sponsored pension and OPEB programs on their behalf. This reduces the budget demands associated with long-term liabilities at the school district level.

As with other areas of state support, Fitch notes that districts face exposure to increasing costs if state budget challenges or policy changes shift more of the debt service or post-employment benefit burden to districts and/or employees. Fitch acknowledges this possibility when evaluating both the expenditure framework and long-term liability burden for school districts; however, given the state responsibility for education, Fitch believes it unlikely states will make changes that meaningfully increase districts’ burdens without offset.
Long-Term Liability Burden

School capital needs tend to be funded by school districts directly using their own resources. As such, Fitch’s analysis of a district’s long-term liability burden includes affordability metrics using the school district’s economic data rather than those of the state.

Long-term debt burdens and expectations for future issuance vary widely among school districts, depending on the age and condition of facilities, enrollment patterns and community priorities. Demographics can also play a more pronounced role in determining school districts’ new debt issuance than is the case for a general purpose government.

On the demand side, the capital requirements are more specific; unlike roads or police stations where there is no per-capita requirement, for schools, each student needs a seat. In addition, the state can influence the level of capital needs, such as through class size requirements and mandated programs. On the political side, it can be difficult to close underutilized schools, requiring ongoing support of excess capacity even if demographics change or shift within the district. On the other hand, areas with large retiree populations may exert pressure to limit debt issuance even when demands exist.

Fitch notes that certain states participate in local district capital programs by directly funding facility construction, providing assistance with district debt service payments or providing credit enhancement that allows for less expensive borrowing, often in the form of a state aid intercept program (see Appendix C). Fitch assesses the level of the state’s commitment to the debt through the life of the bonds as part of the rating process. If there is optionality to the commitment (e.g. if the payment is subject to state appropriation), the debt is included in the district’s debt metrics. This is true even though the debt service is not included in the analysis of the district’s carrying costs.

Like many cities and counties, school districts typically participate in state-sponsored pension and post-employment benefit programs. In many cases, states provide money to the school district to cover all or a portion of pension-related costs; however, if the liability remains the responsibility of the school district, it is treated as such in Fitch’s analysis. In cases where the state is directly responsible for paying pension and OPEB benefits, there is no associated liability for the district. In those cases, the liability is considered a state liability and is included in the state’s long-term liability analysis.

Operating Performance

The considerations that distinguish school district analysis from that of a general purpose government affect analysis of each fundamental rating factor, as discussed, but do not influence the assessment of operating performance. The operating performance assessment addresses how an issuer functions within its operating framework; as such, an assessment of a school district is no different than an assessment of a general purpose government.
Appendix C: State Credit Enhancement Programs

Many states have programs designed to enhance the credit quality of local borrowers with the goal of broadening market access and lowering the cost of capital. The enhancement programs most commonly support school districts but have been developed for other types of local borrowers as well.

The rating approach discussed below covers programs that provide enhancement linked to a state’s general credit quality (i.e. state guaranties, other direct state payment programs, intercept programs). The enhancement provided by permanent funds, for which ratings are unrelated to the state’s general credit quality, is not assessed using these criteria.

Timely Payment Expectation Critical

As the first step in considering the value of a state credit enhancement program, Fitch evaluates the ability of the enhancement program to provide for full and timely payment of debt service. Fitch’s state credit enhancement program criteria are not applied in cases where payment would most likely be delayed until after bond payment dates.

For a program to provide enhancement, procedures should be set forth under state law, regulations and/or administrative guidelines so state payments can be directed to bondholders by debt service payment dates. Notification requirements by paying agents should allow the state sufficient time after a borrower deficiency has been reported to transfer necessary funds to bondholders on or before bond payment dates.

Revenue Adequacy and Stability Key

A second condition for the credit enhancement program criteria to apply is that state funds must be sufficient to pay bond debt service. To make this evaluation, Fitch considers the historical and prospective adequacy of state funds.

For local bonds backed by a state’s GO guaranty, the power of the state’s full faith and credit pledge, as expressed in its IDR/GO rating, reflects the adequacy of revenue. For other direct payment programs, the general fund or other specific state resources that are dedicated to debt service are evaluated for adequacy.

With intercept programs, the focus is on debt service coverage by state funding for a local borrower. For the issuer's bonds to earn the enhancement program rating, annual state funding flows to the issuer must meet minimum coverage levels from historical revenues.

The level of MADS coverage that Fitch considers adequate for a given program varies based on the nature and historical performance of the revenue source that would be intercepted if needed. The most common state credit enhancement programs would intercept appropriated state aid to a participating school district. State school aid is a historically solid revenue source due to the states’ responsibility for funding education (see Appendix B). Therefore, Fitch generally would consider coverage of 1.25x sufficient for a program rating to apply.

For borrowers that are more exposed to the potential for significant state funding reductions, coverage ranging from 1.75x–2.0x or higher would be expected. In some cases, Fitch may consider the state funding flows to be not sufficiently reliable to allow for a program rating, regardless of the coverage level, due to greater potential volatility in the state funding environment.

The characteristics of a participating borrower could warrant higher coverage requirements than would otherwise be needed for the program rating to be applied. One example could be a...
school district that receives state aid on a per-pupil basis and shows a trend of declining enrollment.

In addition to annual calculations, Fitch reviews the timing of state funding receipts during the year when considering whether sufficient coverage by interceptable funds will be available on each debt service payment date. For pooled financings, concern where annual or interceptable period coverage levels are not met by a portion of borrowers can be mitigated by the involvement of and issuance through a state bonding authority, which Fitch expects would exercise a strong commitment to avoiding a default; however, this may be reflected through additional notching below the state’s IDR.

**Program Rating Replaces that of Borrower**

Once Fitch confirms that the state credit enhancement program criteria can be applied, the credit quality of the program replaces the underlying credit quality of the borrower. When assigning ratings pursuant to these criteria, Fitch does not conduct underlying credit analysis of the local government borrowers.

**Program Rating Linked to State IDR**

The state’s general credit condition as expressed through the state IDR is a key consideration in rating an enhancement program, since the same factors that inform the IDR affect the state’s ability to support the payment of local debt.

The relationship between the state IDR and the program rating for various types of enhancement programs is discussed in more detail below.

**State GO Guaranties**

Under GO guaranty programs, states pledge their full faith and credit to the payment of certain local government bonds if the issuer fails to meet its obligation. Therefore, the state’s GO bond rating (IDR) also applies to the enhanced debt of the issuer, as long as timeliness and legal considerations have been satisfied.

**Direct Payment Commitments**

Some states commit themselves to paying borrower debt service from all or part of their general funds or another specific funding source in the event the local borrower’s payment is insufficient. Fitch evaluates the breadth and strength of the state funding commitment pursuant to relevant criteria to determine the enhancement program rating. Depending on the nature of the commitment, this generally involves application of either the appropriation-backed bond or dedicated tax bond rating methodologies outlined in Section 2 of this report.

**Intercepts**

Intercept programs require states to divert to bondholders appropriated but not yet disbursed state funds otherwise due to a local borrower when needed to cover that borrower’s payment deficiencies. Intercept programs that provide an enforceable mechanism for state monies to flow directly to bondholders and adequate coverage and timing provisions to ensure on-time debt service payments will typically be rated one notch lower than the state’s IDR, consistent with the rating methodology for appropriation-backed debt. Fitch can maintain a rating at this level even when interceptable funds are temporarily unavailable due to a budget impasse in cases where it is comfortable that the state remains committed to providing the credit.
enhancement and is actively involved in ensuring the adequacy of funds for bond repayment during the impasse period.

Fitch reviews intercept program mechanics — as expressed in state statute, interagency agreements or through constitutional provisions — to understand how appropriated state funding not yet disbursed to the local borrower would be channeled to bondholders on a timely basis if needed to pay debt service. As noted, the mechanism should include notice of a deficiency to the state, favorably by a paying agent but in no case solely reliant on the borrower, by a date that gives the state time to provide the necessary funds for debt service.

For an intercept rating to be applied to variable-rate debt, it must be established that the intercept mechanism works with the provisions and remedies of any third-party bank credit enhancement or liquidity-support agreements. Fitch also reviews details of each state’s finance and budgeting structures to determine whether and how the intercept would function in the event the state is late in adopting its budget.
Appendix D: Moral Obligations

The term moral obligation (MO) is used widely in the U.S. tax-exempt debt markets and covers a variety of structures. The most common form of MO is via a DSRF replenishment. Under this structure, a DSRF is established and used if the underlying security is insufficient to make the debt service payment. The MO provider then is notified of the DSRF draw and is requested to appropriate funds to replenish the reserve to the specified level.

An MO is a legislative statement of intent but a nonbinding mechanism provided by a governmental entity (the MO provider) to support debt separately secured by a pledged revenue stream issued either by the MO provider or a different issuer. While bondholders are at risk that the MO provider will choose not to provide support in the event the pledged revenue stream proves inadequate, an MO provides evidence of implicit support by an entity that benefits or otherwise has an interest in the success of the financed project or program.

For Fitch to give enhancement credit to an MO, it must be a formal, stated intent detailed in bond documents or other public records and cover the full amount of debt service.

Mechanism for Timely Payment Needed

To provide credit enhancement, the timing of an MO must ensure that funds can be appropriated before a debt service payment is missed. Fitch’s moral obligation criteria are not applied in cases where payment would most likely be delayed until after bond payment dates.

Specific timing directives within the MO mechanism, including the number of days allowed for each step, provide comfort that the MO can be fulfilled in time to avoid a bond payment default.

For Fitch to give credit for the reserve replenishment or any other MO mechanism, the process to notify the MO provider, seek appropriation for the payment and have the payment made to the bond trustee should be clearly detailed in legal documents, such as legislation authorizing the MO provision and documents related to the specific bond issue. The process described should identify the government officials responsible for each step, and with the exception of the actual decision to appropriate, the actions should be mandatory, not discretionary. Also, all officials to be called upon to seek appropriation of funds should have the clear authority to do so.

Furthermore, for Fitch to give credit for a reserve replenishment mechanism, the DSRF must be fully funded, or if the reserve requirement is met via a surety policy, the credit given will be determined in accordance with the criteria for enhancement providers.

Rating Linkage to Moral Obligation Provider Possible

In certain circumstances, the quality of the enhancement can be linked directly to the MO provider rather than the underlying credit, notching downward from the MO provider’s rating. For an MO to allow for downward notching from the provider rating, it must adhere to the following parameters: be provided to an entity that serves a broad government-wide or core purpose; fund an ongoing program rather than a specific project and relate to essential or core governmental operations, such as basic infrastructure; and come from an MO provider that demonstrates further evidence of its involvement in the program, such as a commitment to intercept for the benefit of bondholders state aid that would otherwise be used for the ultimate borrowing entity’s operations.

For moral obligations that do not have these characteristics, Fitch recognizes the credit enhancement of an MO by adjusting the underlying credit’s rating upward. In these cases, the
The first step in the analysis is to assign an underlying rating to the security, either as a public or private rating. The value of the MO is then layered on top of this analysis.

**Determining Enhancement Value of Moral Obligation**

Fitch considers the factors discussed below to determine whether an MO provides rating enhancement value and, if so, the degree of credit quality enhancement.

**Project or Underlying Credit**

Fitch assigns a higher degree of credit enhancement value to MOs that back projects or programs that are traditionally provided by a government entity and provide a broad public benefit. The visibility of the project or program and the degree to which it was openly considered and evaluated offer some indication of the relative importance of the project to the government providing the MO. Projects built for tangential government purposes, including but not limited to economic development projects benefiting a narrow area, will be evaluated as to the project’s importance to the MO provider but are likely to receive less, if any, enhancement credit in the rating analysis.

**Moral Obligation Provider’s Understanding, Interest, and Involvement**

To be considered as enhancing the rating, an MO provider should demonstrate that decision makers, both executive and legislative, are aware of the risks and obligations involved in the project or program, that it may be responsible for the full debt service payment, and that the liability can last for the remaining life of the bonds. Such evidence can include a vote approving the MO action, plans showing the project or program financed to be part of a larger effort with broad public benefit, and public awareness, as demonstrated by disclosure of the plans and MO in public forums. Transparent disclosure of a government’s MOs in its financial reports and official statements provides additional confidence that the government recognizes these contingent liabilities.

**Moral Obligation Provider Considerations**

The credit characteristics of the MO provider and how it treats its MO exposure also play an important role in determining how much credit enhancement value is appropriate. The greatest value is assigned to MO providers that are highly creditworthy, with the financial flexibility and liquidity to readily absorb an unforeseen funding requirement. Fitch considers the totality of the provider’s potential MO exposure for this purpose.

Another positive characteristic for maximizing the enhancement value of an MO is the provider’s selectivity in assigning it. An MO provider that reviews the underlying project’s or program’s credit quality and considers this in its decision to extend its commitment is viewed positively.

**Credit Enhancement Limited**

The short- and long-term credit characteristics of the MO provider, including its financial flexibility and liquidity, are evaluated. The enhancement provided by the MO is unlikely to be higher than two notches below the MO provider’s IDR. The bottom-up approach can generally provide a one- to three-notch rating enhancement, while the top-down approach may provide greater enhancement but would still be limited to two notches below the MO provider’s IDR.

If the credit of the underlying project is equal to or higher than one notch below the MO provider’s IDR, the MO does not enhance the rating.
Consequences of Not Honoring a Moral Obligation

A decision by a government entity acting as an MO provider not to honor a well-vetted MO in a timely manner would cause Fitch to discount or disregard that government’s MOs in its rating analysis and likely affect Fitch’s view of the MO provider’s own ratings. Other Fitch-rated credits to which that MO provider has assigned its MO would also be reviewed and may be downgraded, possibly to the levels of the underlying securities, to reflect a weaker view of the MO and its provider.

Fitch may also review MOs of other countries that have relationships with the MO provider in question. For example, the MOs of a government with which the MO provider is integrated will be reviewed and may be downgraded, possibly to the levels of the underlying securities, to reflect a weaker view of the MO provider’s own ratings. Other Fitch-rated credits to which that MO provider has assigned its MO would also be reviewed and may be downgraded, possibly to the levels of the underlying securities, to reflect a weaker view of the MO and its provider.

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